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CONSTITUTIONAL THEORY FOR CRIMINAL PROCEDURE:
DICKERSON, MIRANDA, AND THE CONTINUING QUEST FOR
BROAD-BUT-SHALLOW
DONALD A. DRIPPS*
The very first paragraph of the Supreme Court's much-awaited
decision in Dickerson v. United States1 declares that Miranda v.
Arizona, 2
being a constitutional decision of this Court, may not be in
effect overruled by an Act of Congress, and we decline to
overrule Miranda ourselves. We therefore hold that Miranda
and its progeny in this Court govern the admissibility of
statements made during custodial interrogation in both state
and federal courts.3
One might suppose that such a simple reaffirmation of the status
quo would call for little scholarly comment. In the context of
constitutional criminal procedure in general, and of Miranda in
particular, however, there is nothing simple about reaffirming the
status quo.
* James Levee Professor of Law and Criminal Procedure, University of Minnesota.
BA., Northwestern, 1980; J.D., Michigan, 1983. This project benefitted greatly from
conversations with Richard Frase, Barry Feld, Daniel Yeager and George Thomas.
Special thanks to Yale Kamisar for helpful comments on a prior draft.
1. 530 U.S. 428 (2000).
2. 384 U.S. 436 (1966).
3. Dickerson, 530 U.S. at 432.
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For a quarter of a century, some of the Court's cases have
characterized Miranda's requirements as "not themselves rights
protected by the Constitution" but instead as "measures to insure
that the right against compulsory self-incrimination [is] protected."4
More succinctly, Miranda was described as a mere "prophylactic
rule."' The Fourth Circuit had concluded that, given this charac-
terization of Miranda as prophylactic rather than constitutional,
Title II of the 1968 Omnibus Crime Control and Safe Streets Act
6
(a congressional statute purporting to return to the pre-Miranda
voluntariness test) was constitutional.' Complying with the statute,
the court of appeals ruled that the district court should have
admitted a statement obtained in violation of the Miranda
rules.' The Supreme Court's Dickerson opinion rejected the Fourth
Circuit's conclusion that Miranda was not a constitutional
decision.9 But the opinion did not repudiate prior cases admitting
evidence derived from Miranda violations or allowing impeachment
with Miranda-tainted statements, cases that were justified in large
measure by the prophylactic-rules characterization.
Miranda's academic defenders had hoped that if the majority
refused to overrule Miranda, the opinion might have restored the
Warren Court's "original vision" of Miranda as a constitutional
antidote to the per se compulsion attending custodial interro-
gation.' ° AfterDickerson Miranda seems securely established in the
constitutional order; the Court reaffirmed present law. But present
law is itself unstable.
To take an example, in prior cases the Court has upheld the
use of Miranda-tainted statements to impeach the testimony of
defendants who elect to testify in their own defense." Part of the
4. Michigan v. Tucker, 417 U.S. 433,444 (1974).
5. New York v. Quarles, 467 U.S. 649, 657 (1984).
6. 18 U.S.C. § 3501 (1994).
7. United States v. Dickerson, 166 F.3d 667, 692 (4th Cir. 1999), rev'd, 530 U.S. 428
(2000).
8. Id. at 695.
9. Dickerson, 530 U.S. at 432.
10. See Yale Kamisar, Can (Did) Congress "Overrule"Miranda?, 85 CORNELLL. REV. 883,
936-50 (2000) (arguing that the prophylactic-rules cases are inconsistent with Miranda's
constitutional justification); Charles D. Weisselberg, Saving Miranda, 84 CORNELL L. REV.
109, 140-88 (1998) (same).
11. Oregon v. Hass, 420 U.S. 714, 722-24 (1975) (statement obtained by continued
questioning after suspect invoked Miranda rights admissible to impeach); Harris v. New
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justification for this impeachment exception was the theory that
Miranda announced prophylactic safeguards rather than consti-
tutionally required safeguards.' In contrast, when a defendant
testifies after giving clearly compelled testimony before a grand jury
under an immunity order, the Court has refused to permit
impeachment with the compelled testimony." Thus if Dickerson
takes the stand at his trial on remand, he can be impeached with
the very statement that the Court has just suppressed on the
ground that the interrogation violated a "constitutional rule"
derived from the Fifth Amendment. In effect, the same statement
might be deemed compelled and not compelled in the same case.
The Justices are aware of their own precedents. The fact that
Chief Justice Rehnquist, for decades an implacable critic of
Miranda,4 wrote the majority opinion, is more than one of those
rich ironies with which our constitutional history abounds. It is
also a sure sign of a compromise opinion, intentionally written to
say less rather than more, for the sake of achieving a strong
majority on the narrow question of Miranda's continued vitality.
Dickerson therefore qualifies as a "minimalist" opinion of the
sort recently defended by Professor Cass Sunstein."5 With many
qualifications, Sunstein makes the case for judicial decisions that
announce narrow rather than broad rules for the future, justified
by particular considerations in the case at hand rather than by
appeals to first principles or comprehensive general theories.'6 More
York, 401 U.S. 222, 225-26 (1971) (statement obtained by custodial questioning absent
adequate warning admissible to impeach).
12. In Hass, for instance, the majority opinion seems to distinguish Miranda violations
from genuine constitutional violations by noting that "[t]here is no evidence or suggestion
that Hass' statements ... were involuntary or coerced." Hass, 420 U.S. at 722.
13. New Jersey v. Portash, 440 U.S. 450, 459-60 (1979).
14. Then-Justice Rehnquistwrote the majorityopinions in Tucker andHass, and worked
in the Justice Department office that seems to have originated the prophylactic-rules
characterization of Miranda in a 1969 memorandum. See Lawrence Herman, The Supreme
Court, the Attorney General, and the Good Old Days of Police Interrogation, 48 OHIO ST. L.
J. 733,738-39 n.44 (1987); Kamisar, supra note 10, at 925 n.217. Dickerson in all probability
does not reflect any change in the Chief Justice's views of Miranda's merits. See Dickerson,
530 U.S. at 443 ("Whether or not we would agree with Miranda's reasoning and its resulting
rule were we addressing the issue in the first instance, the principles of stare decisis weigh
heavily against overruling it now.").
15. CAss R. SUNSTEIN, ONE CASEATATIIE (1999).
16. Id.
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succinctly, judicial opinions should minimize the width of the rules
they announce, as well as the depth of the reasons they give.
17
This description fits Dickerson exactly. Yet Professor Sunstein
himself identifies Miranda as a case in which a wide rule might
very well be justified. 8 Minimalism's virtues depend on the context.
In this Article, I adopt Sunstein's distinction between minimalist
and maximalist opinions-measured on the axes of width and
depth-to analyze Miranda, Dickerson and criminal procedure
doctrine more generally. The Article argues that, because of the
volume of constitutional litigation in criminal cases and because of
the demonstrable failure of legislatures to deal constructively with
criminal procedure problems, width is a virtue rather than a vice in
constitutional criminal procedure.
But width has a problem in criminal procedure. If a Supreme
Court majority supports a wide ruling with a fully theorized
opinion, such a deep justification will be intensely controversial.
Rarely will a deep justification persuade a majority, and over time
deep justifications that do win majority support are likely to lose it.
At that point the rule may remain highly desirable from a policy
standpoint but illegitimate from the standpoint of constitutional
law. On the other hand, if a wide rule is maintained by a majority
that does not accept a fully theorized account, the application of the
rule in future cases will be arbitrary. Justices who adhere to a
particular rule solely because some rule is required have no guide
to interpreting the rule beyond maintaining its categorical form.
Thus criminal procedure calls for wide rulings, but these may
very well suffer from a legitimacy deficit and evoke subsequent
inconsistent applications. Given the case for wide rules in criminal
procedure cases, however, a return to case-by-case adjudication is
highly unattractive. What criminal procedure needs is a legitimate
doctrinal basis for broad rulings. Ideally, such a basis would com-
mand normative respect from various ideological perspectives,
which would reduce both collective decision problems in future
cases and the risk of hostile political reaction of the sort exemplified
by Title II. What we are looking for, in other words, is a shallow
justification for wide rules.
17. Id.
18. Id. at 55.
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This Article concludes by suggesting two such possibilities. First,
if the Justices adopted a more scrupulous approach to stare decisis
in criminal procedure cases, wide rules, once announced, might be
sustainable even after their deep justifications have lost majority
support. By scrupulous stare decisis I mean two distinct attitudes.
The first is a willingness on the part of individual Justices not
just to adhere to the narrow holdings of past cases, but also to
accept their justifications, or devise and articulate a convincing
alternative justification for them. The second is a readiness on the
part of Supreme Court majorities to overrule outlying precedents.
Although apparently in tension with one another, these two
attitudes actually reflect both a common concern for pragmatic
criminal procedure doctrine and a common recognition that the
Court, not its constituent Justices, is the final authority on consti-
tutional interpretation.
A second strategy proposes grounding criminal procedure rules
in more general textual bases, such as the Fourth Amendment's
reasonableness clause or the requirement of procedural fairness
expressed by the due process clauses. The familiar procedural due
process standard of Mathews v. Eldridge,9 premised on instru-
mental reliability, supplies the doctrinal predicate for wide rules of
minimally acceptable procedures in administrative entitlement
cases. 0 Substantive due process, in the blandest and least contro-
versial form, requires that deprivations of liberty be reasonable
exercises of the police power. The Fourth Amendment cases have
given that formulation somewhat more precision: restraints on
liberty and invasions of privacy must be proportioned to the
probability that crime will thereby be detected or prevented.
Normatively these principles command very wide respect across a
variety of ideological perspectives. So far as I know, no one favors
unreliable procedures, or unreasonable restraints on liberty.
Yet in modern criminal cases, the Court has purported to limit
due process inquiry so as to confine, for practical purposes, criminal
procedure doctrine to the specific provisions in the Bill of Rights. If
19. 424 U.S. 319 (1976).
20. See id- at 332-35 (depriving an entity of a property interest secured by an
administrative entitlement statute requires due process procedures determined by the
weight ofthe individual interest, the degree to which additionalprocedural safeguards would
reduce the risk of error, and the cost of additional procedures).
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my argument is correct, this turn is likely to perpetuate criminal
procedure's current problems. The need to guide law enforcement
agencies and lower courts in millions of future cases will push the
Court in the direction of announcing bright-line rules, which can be
tethered to the Bill of Rights only by intensely controversial
doctrinal moves. Subsequent decisions by majorities that do not
subscribe to the deep reasoning of prior cases will foster in-
consistency and uncertaintyin the law. Ingenious legalisms and the
vigorous pruning of outlying precedents may palliate the situation,
but in the end, doctrine and values must be brought into line with
one another. If forced to choose between unstable rules very loosely
based on the Bill of Rights, and stable rules firmly based on a
constitutional commitment to fair trials and reasonable police
practices, the balance of considerations inclines in favor of the
latter.
If the choice between those alternatives is a close one, the choice
between any likely set of broad rules and a regime of case-by-case
adjudication is somewhat easier. The very factors that Professor
Sunstein considers supportive of minimalism generally support
wide rules in the criminal procedure context. It turns out that
one's general approach to constitutional law-one's constitutional
theory-may vary, without inconsistency, from one set of cases to
another. Somewhat ironically then, a pragmatic approach rooted in
skepticism about constitutional theory may very well foster not the
death of theory, but a plurality of constitutional theories, each
regulating an important but distinct domain.
I. A THEORETICAL FRAMEWORm MINIMALISM AND MAXIMALISM
A portion of Cass Sunstein's recent work, drawn together in the
book One Case at a Time, has developed a defense of narrow judicial
decisions supported by shallow, rather than deep, justifications."
In this account, a narrow decision is one that does not purport to
determine the outcome of many future cases.2 By contrast, a wide
or broad ruling does purport to govern the outcome of many future
21. SUNSTEIN, supra note 15.
22. Id. at 10-11.
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cases. 2 3 A narrow ruling is highly contextualized; analogies to
subsequent cases will be possible but not automatic.' Wide rulings
take a more categorical form and identify as few facts as necessary
and sufficient to determine the result.' Wide rulings thus have
the flavor of legislation, although they emerge from the process of
adjudication.
A shallow justification, according to Sunstein, appeals to a
wide range of otherwise conflicting general political, moral, or
jurisprudential perspectives. 6 Shallow justifications make possible
"concrete judgments on particular cases, unaccompanied by ab-
stract accounts about what accounts for those judgments. "  When
individuals with diverse abstract commitments agree on a partic-
ular result, we have a case of "incompletely theorized" agreement.'
For example, "[pleople who disagree on a great deal may agree that
torture is unconstitutional, or that people deserve compensation for
physical invasions of their property."'
This last quotation captures an important strain in Sunstein's
m ii alism. Virtually everyone who thinks about the subject agrees
on a surprisingly extensive set of substantive conclusions about
American constitutional law.'0 This core includes the propositions
that torture and expropriation, for instance, are unconstitutional.3 '
The core will change over time, but in any given case there is a
broad field of common ground upon which constitutional arguments
by analogy can be based.32
Sunstein argues that judges often should confine themselves
to narrow rulings supported by shallow justifications, i.e., to
"minimalist" decisions. 3 Judicial minim alm may promote a
variety of weighty values. linimalism encourages rather than
terminates democratic political processes, and thereby reduces the
23. Id.
24. Id.
25. IM
26. Id at 13-14.
27. Id. at 13 (emphasis omitted).
28. Id. at 13-14.
29. Id.
30. Id. at 63-68.
31. Id. at 66-67.
32. Id. at 63-68.
33. Id. at 3-72.
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risk of a political backlash against the courts.3 4 Minimalism also
reduces the risk that the judges may be in error, because narrow
rulings minimize future commitments, enabling a change of course
in subsequent cases. 5 In addition, shallow justifications, tethered
to the Constitution's common core of agreed-upon substantive
commitments, enable people with strongly held but opposing
abstract political, moral or jurisprudential positions to agree on the
resolution of particular disputes. 6
Sunstein scrupulously points out that minimalism is not always
appropriate.3 7 Minimalism may sometimes be inevitable, because it
offers "the only possible route for a multimember tribunal, which
may be incapable of bridging its many disagreements, and which
may be able to converge only on a minimal ruling."38 Even when a
broader or deeper ruling is obtainable, however, the choice between
judicial minimalism and maximalism is not automatic. 39
Sunstein generalizes as follows:
[It is worthwhile to attempt a broad and deep solution (1) when
judges have considerable confidence in the merits of that
solution, (2) when the solution can reduce costly uncertainty for
future courts and litigants, (3) when advance planning is
important, and (4) when a maximalist approach will promote
democratic goals either by creating the preconditions for
democracy or by imposing good incentives on elected officials,
incentives to which they are likely to be responsive. Minimalism
becomes more attractive (1) when judges are proceeding in the
midst of(constitutionally relevant) factual or moral uncertainty
and rapidly changing circumstances, (2) when any solution
seems likely to be confounded by future cases, (3) when the need
for advance planning does not seem insistent, and (4) when the
preconditions for democratic self-government are not at stake
and democratic goals are not likely to be promoted by a rule-
bound judgment. 0
34. Id at 24-45.
35. Id, at 49-50.
36. Id. at 61-72.
37. Id. at 57-60.
38. Id. at 57.
39. Id.
40. Id
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Despite the apparent humility of this approach, it has considerable
analytical power and normative appeal.
Sunstein's account accurately captures a great deal of the actual
practice of constitutional law, providing a generalized account of
elements that seem powerfully attractive in the work of prudent
and careful jurists such as Justices Harlan, Stewart, and Kennedy.
Although the theory of judicial minimalism is motivated by the
desire to promote justice, it also respects the conventional con-
straints on constitutional interpretation, steering an elegant middle
course between judicial activism and judicial abdication. It con-
structively addresses the implications of social choice theory for the
work of the Court.
The next two sections compare and contrast Miranda and
Dickerson in light of the categories used by Sunstein to delineate
the minim alist/maximalist distinction. The comparison illuminates
both cases in important ways, and substantiates the intuition that
although Dickerson's holding is that Miranda remains the law,
there is a world of difference between the two decisions.
II. MIRANDA'S EXEMPLARY MAXIMALISM
A. The Road to Miranda
By the early 1960s, the Supreme Court had decided more than
thirty cases in which defendants challenged the admission of
confessions at state trials.4 The test applied in these cases
demanded exclusion of "confessions which are involuntary, i.e., the
product of coercion, either physical or psychological."42
Lower courts, police officers, and commentators were never sure
which focus of the test was more important-the subjective capacity
of the suspect to resist police pressure, or the objective tendency
of the police methods to cause a typical suspect to confess. Nor did
the Court ever succeed in clarifying how much pressure amounted
to "coercion." Although the Court did come to focus on certain
41. Wilfred J. Ritz, Twenty-Five Years of State Criminal Confession Cases in the U.S.
Supreme Court, 19 WASH. & LEE L. REv. 35,35-36 (1962).
42. Rogers v. Richmond, 365 U.S. 534, 540 (1961).
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"hallmarks" of coercion, even physical violence to the suspect was
never declared per se unconstitutional.'
The vagueness of the voluntariness standard had at least two
unfortunate consequences. First, because the Supreme Court could
review only a very few confessions cases-typically capital cases-
enforcement of the voluntariness test was left largely to the state
courts. This was not a very strong guarantee against police
coercion. Second, the police themselves had neither the ability nor
any incentive to comply with the voluntariness test."
The voluntariness standard's defects are well illustrated by the
1961 decision in Culombe v. Connecticut.' Culombe was "a thirty-
three-year-old mental defective of the moron class with an intelli-
gence quotient of sixty-four and a mental age of nine to nine and a
half years. He was wholly illiterate."46 On a Saturday afternoon,
Connecticut police asked Culombe if he would come to the station
for questioning about a double murder; Culombe agreed. He soon
asked for a lawyer, and was told that he could have a lawyer if he
would name one; but the police knew that Culombe was illiterate
and thus unable to use the telephone directory. 7
On Saturday night the police formally arrested Culombe on
suspicion of committing a felony. On Sunday the police added a
breach of the peace charge. On both days police questioned the
suspect, but the interrogation was not continuous, involved no
physical violence or deprivation, and was confined to reasonable
43. In Watts v. Indiana, 338 U.S. 49, 59-60 (1949) (Jackson, J., concurring and
dissenting), Justice Jackson wrote that "[o]fcourse, no confession that has been obtained by
any form of physical violence to the person is reliable and hence no conviction should rest
upon one obtained in that manner." But the Court subsequently admitted confessions made
after the police had physically struck or threatened the suspect. See Stroblev. California, 343
U.S. 181, 190-91 (1952) (holding that a confession was voluntary when the defendant was
kicked and threatened with a blackjack one hour before questioning).
44. See Comment, The Coerced Confession Cases in Search of a Rationale, 31 U. CHI. L.
REV. 313, 320 (1964):
As the law now stands the police have little to lose from interrogation. They can
apply increasingly greater pressure until the suspect confesses. If the confession
is admissible, well and good. If it is not, no harm has been done since the police
wouldn't have been able to get the confession unless they had applied the
pressure.
45. 367 U.S. 568 (1961).
46. Id. at 620 (footnote omitted).
47. Id. at 608-09.
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times of the day. Culombe confessed to stealing some canned goods,
but not to murder.48
Not until Tuesday did the police present Culombe to a court. He
was charged only with breach of the peace; at the behest of the
prosecution, the judge continued the case for a week and committed
the suspect to custody until that time. Culombe was not heard by
the court and counsel was not appointed. Not until Wednesday did
Culombe confess to the murders.49
Justice Frankfurter wrote a sixty-seven page opinion, loaded with
the ballast of ninety-seven footnotes. He surveyed the policy con-
siderations that make confessions a difficult subject;"0 he reviewed
the history of confessions in Anglo-American jurisprudence;5 he
canvassed the decided cases of the Court;5  and then restated the
process of applying the voluntariness standard." After a minute
examination of the record, he found it "clear" that Culombe's "will
was broken Wednesday afternoon." "
Only Justice Stewart joined Frankfurter's opinion.55 The other
votes for reversal came from Warren, Douglas, Black, and Brennan,
all of whom disagreed with much of what Frankfurter had said. 6
The Chief Justice, in an opinion made rather droll by his later
performance in Miranda, denounced Frankfurter's "treatise" as an
"advisory opinion"; in Warren's view, "the reasons which have com-
pelled the Court to develop the law on a case-by-case approach, to
declare legal principles only in the context of specific factual
situations, and to avoid expounding more than is necessary for the
decision of a given case are persuasive."57
In stark contrast, Justice Douglas, joined by Black, thought the
case "a simple one" not because of the voluntariness rule, but
because the Sixth and Fourteenth Amendment's right to counsel
48. Id. at 609-18.
49. Id. at 611-15.
50. Id. at 570-87.
51. Id. at 587-98.
52. Id. at 598-602.
53. Id. at 603-06.
54. Id. at 634.
55. Id. at 568.
56. Id. at 635-36 (Warren, C.J., concurring); 637-41 (Douglas, J., concurring); 642
(Brennan, J., concurring).
57. Id. at 636 (Warren, C.J., concurring).
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protected Culombe against questioning after he requested a
lawyer.5" Far from a fact-specific, case-by-case approach, the
Douglas suggestion was that the Court should replace the due
process analysis with a selective incorporation analysis that
would require the availability of counsel during questioning in
every case.59 The Douglas position had been rejected by the
Court in Crooker v. California,60 and for a compelling reason. The
"doctrine suggested by petitioner... would effectively preclude police
questioning-fair as well as unfair-until the accused was afforded
opportunity to call his attorney."6'
Justice Brennan agreed with only that portion of the Frankfurter
opinion dealing with the specific facts of Culombe's case, implicitly
agreeing with Warren. 2 Justice Harlan, joined by Clark and
Whittaker, dissented; although he agreed with the generalizations
in the Frankfurter opinion, Harlan thought those considerations
led to the conclusion that Culombe's confession was voluntary.63 As
Warren tartly observed, this augured poorly for the project of
clarifying the law of confessions."
58. Id. at 637 (Douglas, J., concurring).
59. Id.
60. 357 U.S. 433 (1958).
61. Id. at 441. Arguably the Court's decision inHaynes v. Washington, 373 U.S. 503,513-
15 (1963), holding a confession involuntary when the police refused the suspect contact with
his wife, implicitly overruled Crooker even before Miranda. See Yale Kamisar, Remembering
the "Old World"of Criminal Procedure: AReply to Professor Grano, 23 U. MICH. J.L. REFORM
537, 569-75 (1990). On the other hand, in Fare v. Michael C., 442 U.S. 707, 726-27 (1979), the
Court held that a juvenile suspect's request to speak with his probation officer did not
amount to an invocation of Miranda rights. Michael C. emphasized the Miranda decision's
'perception" of counsel's 'unique ability to protect the Fifth Amendment rights of a client
undergoing custodial interrogation." Michael C., 442 U.S. at 719. Arguably, then, absent
Miranda, police refusal to permit consultation with counsel would not violate the due process
voluntariness test.
62. Culombe, 367 U.S. at 641-42.
63. Id. at 642 (Harlan, J., dissenting).
64. Id. at 636 (Warren, C.J., concurring). The Chief Justice wrote:
The opinion was unquestionably written with the intention of clarifying these
problems and of establishing a set of principles which could be easily applied in
any coerced-confession situation. However, it is doubtful that such will be the
result, for while three members of the Court agree to the general principles
enunciated by the opinion, they construe those principles as requiring a result
in this case exactly the opposite from that reached by the author of the opinion.
This being true, it cannot be assumed that the lower courts and law
enforcement agencies will receive better guidance from the treatise for which
this case seems to have provided a vehicle.
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Given the dismal failure of this determined effort to clarify the
voluntariness standard, the Justices began to look for some
alternative to the due process analysis. In 1963, Gideon v.
Wainwright" incorporated the Sixth Amendment and required the
appointment of counsel for indigent felony defendants in state
courts.66 The next year the Court, in an opinion susceptible to
various interpretations, relied on the Sixth Amendment right-to-
counsel to throw out a confession given by a suspect who was
not coerced but who asked to consult his lawyer at the very
time that the lawyer was asking the police for permission to
see the client." That same year the Court incorporated the
Fifth Amendment privilege against self-incrimination into the
Fourteenth Amendment's due process clause." Legal doctrine
suddenly offered a variety of new options for regulating police
interrogation on a wholesale, rather than a retail, basis.
B. Miranda v. Arizona: When, and How, to Do Maximalism
In the Autumn of 1965, the Justices and their law clerks waded
through one hundred and fifty petitions for certiorari raising issues
under Escobedo."9 Four of the petitions were granted on November
22; a fifth petition was granted two weeks later.70
In two of the cases-Miranda v. Arizona7l and Vignera v. New
York72-- the criminal defendant challenged state court rulings that
put the burden of requesting counsel on the suspect. The Justices
also chose to hear a federal case, Westover v. United States, 73 in
Id,
65. 372 U.S. 335 (1963).
66. Id. at 341-45.
67. Escobedov. Illinois, 378 U.S. 478,490-91(1964) (holdingthatSixthAmendmentright
to counsel requires suppression of statements made by uncharged suspect who had become
focus of police investigation who asked to see lawyer while lawyer was asking police for
permission to see the suspect).
68. Malloy v. Hogan, 378 U.S. 1, 8 (1964) (holding that Fourteenth Amendment due
process clause incorporates Fifth Amendment privilege against self-incrimination).
69. LiVA BAKER, MIRANDA: CRIME, LAw AND POLITIcS 103 (1983).
70. Id. at 103-05.
71. 401 P.2d 721 (Ariz. 1965), rev'd, 384 U.S. 436 (1966).
72. 207 N.E.2d 527 (N.Y. 1965) (mem.), rev'd sub nom. Mirandav. Arizona, 384 U.S. 436
(1966). For the facts, see the Supreme Court's opinion in Miranda, 384 U.S. at 493-94.
73. 342 F.2d 684 (9th Cir. 1965), rev'd, 384 U.S. 436 (1966).
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which the defendant challenged confessions given to agents of
the FBI.' The FBI enjoyed the prestige of the nation's most
elite law enforcement agency; the warnings given by its agents
were considered state of the art.75 A fourth case, Johnson v. New
Jersey,76 raised the question of whether Escobedo applied retro-
actively. In the final case, California v. Stewart, 7 the state asked
the Supreme Court to reinstate a conviction overturned by the
California Supreme Court. In Stewart, neither party had introduced
evidence to show that the suspect either had, or had not, been
warned of the rights to silence and counsel.7' The California court
reversed the conviction, in effect placing upon the government the
burden of proving that a confession was preceded by a warning of
rights.7
9
This deliberate selection of representative cases as vehicles for
the making of general policy was not quite unprecedented. The
Court had done much the same thing in the trilogy of habeas
corpus cases decided under the name of Brown v. Allen.8 ° It would
take this approach again in the 1975 term's death penalty cases.8 '
Nonetheless, it was quite clear that in the 1966 confession cases,
the Court was engaged in an extraordinary project: not just
resolving some difficult cases, but establishing general rules to
guide police and lower courts in handling confessions. Although
adjudicatory in form, and styled as constitutional adjudication at
that, the proceedings before the Court were in spirit not unlike
those observed in an administrative rulemaking proceeding.
Certainly no administrative agency could have generated a more
thorough or thoughtful survey of the confessions problem. The brief
for Miranda, whom the police had not warned of a right to counsel,
74. Id. at 686.
75. Miranda, 384 U.S. at 483-86.
76. 206 A.2d 737 (N.J. 1965), rev'd, 384 U.S. 719, 733 (1966) (holding that neither
Escobedo nor Miranda applied to cases tried prior to the opinion in each case).
77. 400 P.2d 97 (Cal. 1965), affd 384 U.S. 436 (1966).
78. Id. at 100.
79. Id. at 103.
80. 344 U.S. 443 (1953).
81. Gregg v. Georgia, 428 U.S. 153 (1976) (upholding guided-discretion death penalty
statute); Profflitt v. Florida, 428 U.S. 242 (1976) (same); Jurek v. Texas, 428 U.S. 262 (1976)
(same); Woodson v. North Carolina, 428 U.S. 280 (1976) (striking down mandatory death
penalty for first-degree murder); Roberts v. Louisiana, 428 U.S. 325 (1976) (same).
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relied on the Sixth Amendment, arguing that Escobedo applied to
suspects who had neither retained, nor requested, counsel.8 2
Counsel for Westover, whom the FBI had warned, necessarily went
further, and argued that the Sixth Amendment could only be
satisfied by actual consultation with counsel.8" Vignera's lawyer not
only advanced the Sixth Amendment argument predicated on
Escobedo, he also attacked the confession as the fruit of unlawful
detention and urged the Court to enforce the McNabb-Mallory rule
against the states under the authority of Mapp."
InMiranda, the American Civil Liberties Union filedwhat is now
one of the most famous briefs in the history of the Court. In it,
Anthony Amsterdam and Paul Mishkin characterized the right
to counsel at the interrogation stage as a means of enforcing the
Fifth Amendment right to silence.85 They quoted extensively from
police interrogation manuals to support their claim that custodial
interrogation is "inherently compelling." 6 Only the presence of
counsel, they argued, could dispel the compulsion inherent in custo-
dial questioning and so vindicate the Fifth Amendment privilege
against self-incrimination."
In the brief for the United States in the Westover case, the
Department of Justice took the position that the Sixth Amendment
did not apply until the commencement of formal proceedings.88 The
government explained Escobedo as a case of deliberate delay by the
prosecution in filing formal charges-that is, as an attempt to
circumvent the ruling in Massiah.9 Escobedo accordingly deserved
very limited application.
Like the ACLU, the United States argued that the relevant
amendment was the Fifth; but in the view of the government,
compulsion, just like coercion under the due process test, must be
82. Brief for Petitioner at 30-35, Miranda v. Arizona, 384 U.S. 436 (1966) (No. 759).
83. Opening Brief for the Petitioner at 21-31, Westover v. United States, 342 F.2d 684
(9th Cir. 1965) (No. 761).
84. Brief for Petitioner at 9,28, Vignera v. New York, 384 U.S. 436 (1966) (No. 760).
85. Brief of the American Civil Liberties Union, Amicus Curiae, at 5-31, Miranda v.
Arizona 384 U.S. 436 (1966) (No. 759) [hereinafter ACLU Brief].
86. Id. at 13-20.
87. Id. at 22-31.
88. Brief for the United States at 38-42, Westover v. United States, 384 U.S. 436 (1966)
(No. 761).
89. Id, at 38-42.
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evident from the totality of the circumstances. In some cases, the
United States maintained, the suspect need not even be warned of
the right to remain silent.90 As for a warning about the right to
counsel, because the government denied any Sixth Amendment
right to consult with counsel before the filing of a formal charge,
unindicted suspects need not be warned about a right they did not
possess. 91
Both the United States, 2 and twenty-seven states that endorsed
an amicus brief authored by Louis J. Lefkowitz and Telford
Taylor,9" urged the Court to await possible legislative action,
especially in light of the American Law Institute's then-pending
Model Code ofPre-Arraignment Procedure.9" Along similar lines, the
National District Attorneys Association urged the Court to adopt an
"advisory rule"--whatever rule the Court deemed wise, so long as
it would not be enforced with the exclusionary sanction.95 Arizona
defended Miranda's conviction on the ground accepted by many
lower courts-that Escobedo only forbade police frustration of the
suspect's request for counsel, and did not affirmatively mandate
advising the suspect of the right to consult an attorney.96 All of the
government parties stressed the importance of confessions to law
enforcement, and the incompatibility of defense counsel's presence
with successful interrogation.
Early in the oral arguments, it became clear that the heart
of the controversy was the Fifth Amendment, not the Sixth.9
90. Id. at 28-37.
91. Id. at 44.
92. Id. at 45.
93. Brief of the State of New York et al. at 35-39, Miranda v. Arizona, 384 U.S. 436 (1966)
(No. 759).
94. Id.
95. Brief of Amicus Curiae National District Attorneys Association, at 21-26, Miranda
(No. 759).
96. Brief for Respondent at 18-25, Miranda (No. 759).
97. The second Justice to interrupt John Flynn's argument for Miranda was Potter
Stewart. This colloquy occurred:
MR. JUSTICE STEWART: What do you think is the result of the adversary
process coming into being when this focusing takes place? What follows from
that? Is there, then, a right to a lawyer?
MR. FLYNN: I think that the man at that time has the right to exercise, if he
knows, and under the present state of the law in Arizona, if he is rich enough,
and if he's educated enough to assert his Fifth Amendment right, and if he
recognizes that he has a Fifth Amendment right to request counsel. But I
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Justice Goldberg, the author of Escobedo, had resigned to represent
the United States at the U.N.9" His replacement, Abe Fortas, was
a deep believer in the privilege against self-incrimination. 99 Perhaps
the reason for the sea-change was this shift injudicial personalities;
perhaps it was the force of the ACLU brief. No doubt these factors
played their role, but it is certainly true that the right-to-counsel
approach did not offer a satisfactory approach to the confessions
problem.
The ultimate defect in the right-to-counsel approach in the
confessions context is the same as it is in the line-up context; how
is counsel supposed to "assist" the suspect during interrogation?
Whatever answer is given presupposes some legal rights that
counsel can assert on the suspect's behalf. The right to counsel,
whether at trial or before, is derivative of other procedural
safeguards. Counsel can never obtain more than the law allows; it
follows that counsel is no more than a means to secure some other
legal right.
simply say that at that stage of the proceeding, under the facts and
circumstances inMiranda ofaman of limited education, ofaman who certainly
is mentally abnormal, who is certainly an indigent, that when that adversary
process came into being that the police, at the very least, had an obligation to
extend to this man not only his clear Fifth Amendment right, but to accord him
the right of counsel.
MR. JUSTICE STEWART: I suppose, if you really mean what you say or what
you gather from what the Escobedo decision says, the adversary process starts
at that point, and every single protection of the Constitution then comes into
being, does it not? You have to bring a jury in there, I suppose?
MR. FLYNN: No, YourHonor, I wouldn't bring ajuryin. I simply would extend
to the man those constitutional rights which the police, at that time, took away
from him.
MR. JUSTICE STEWART: That's begging the question. My question is, what
are those rights when the focusing begins? Are these all the panoply of rights
guaranteed to the defendant in a criminal trial?
MR. FLYNN: I think the first right is the Fifth Amendment right: the right not
to incriminate oneself, the right to know you have that right; and the right
consult with counsel, at the very least, in order that you can exercise the right
Your Honor.
Transcript of Oral Argument in Miranda v. Arizona, 384 U.S. 436 (1966) in 63 LANDMARK
BRIEFS AND ARGUMENTS OF THE SUPREME COURT 849 (1975) (emphasis added).
98. BERNARD SCHWARTZ, SUPER CH[EF. EARL WARREN AND HIs SUPREME COuRT 583
(1983).
99. Id. at 584.
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Thus the suspect's right to silence is logically prior to the right to
counsel. Before Malloy, the state had the constitutional authority
to check the privilege against self-incrimination at the door of the
stationhouse.'0 But after Malloy, federal constitutional law forbade
any state compulsion of incriminating statements.' 01 Was police
interrogation compulsion? If it was, could statements obtained by
the police from suspects in custody ever be admitted into evidence?
Remarkably, the Supreme Court answered both questions in the
affirmative."0 2
The Miranda majority consisted of just five Justices-Douglas,
Brennan, Black, Fortas, and Warren.10 3 The Chief Justice assigned
the opinion to himself, and delivered a true essay in constitutional
policymaking. Police interrogation in general, Warren wrote, con-
stitutes compulsion.10' Therefore, the Fifth Amendment requires
safeguards that mitigate the compulsion typical of police ques-
tioning; and the famous warning is the minimum safeguard
consistent with the Fifth Amendment.
10 5
To this day the Miranda opinion's treatment of the compulsion
issue remains, well, compelling. Warren described the typical cir-
cumstances of custodial interrogation-the secret surroundings and
the atmosphere of domination.0 6 He followed this account with a
devastatingly effective survey of the interrogation manuals-
manuals still in use today.
Confession is obviously contrary to the immediate self-interest of
the suspect. Why then do so many suspects confess? The manuals
advise the police to create and maintain an environment of total
"privacy" and to convey the impression that the questioning will
continue for as long as it takes for the suspect to confess.1'0 The
officer should sympathize with the suspect and minimize the
seriousness of the crime. "Good cop/bad cop" is played to heighten
the suspect's anxiety while offering a sympathetic ear. The suspect
can be confronted with made-up "evidence" to convince him that the
100. Twining v. New Jersey, 211 U.S. 78, 99 (1908).
101. Malloy v. Hogan, 378 U.S. 1, 6 (1964).
102. Miranda v. Arizona, 384 U.S. 436,458 (1966).
103. SCHWARTZ, supra note 98, at 590.
104. Miranda, 384 U.S. at 458.
105. Id. at 467-68.
106. Id. at 461.
107. Id. at 449-50.
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game is over and confession is his last chance for sympathetic
treatment.108
Do these tactics amount to "compulsion" within the meaning of
the privilege? Warren wrote that:
all the principles embodied in the privilege apply to informal
compulsion exerted by law-enforcement officers during in-
custody questioning. An individual swept from familiar
surroundings into police custody, surrounded by antagonistic
forces, and subjected to the techniques of persuasion described
[in the manuals] cannot be otherwise other than under
compulsion to speak. As a practical matter, the compulsion to
speak in the isolated setting of the police station may well be
greater than in courts or other official investigations, where
there are often impartial observers to guard against
intimidation or trickery."°9
By way of comparison, a will drafted under circumstances similar
to those of custodial questioning certainly would be held void for
undue influence. " 0
What did police interrogation ingeneral have to do with the cases
for decision? Warren admitted that the records in the individual
cases did not show "overt physical coercion or patent pscyhological
ploys," but the "fact remains that in none of these cases did the
officers undertake to afford appropriate safeguards at the outset of
the interrogation to insure that the statements were truly the
product of free choice.""' In effect, compulsion is presumed from the
facts of custody and questioning.
The Miranda Court described the famous warning as one way of
dispelling the compulsion implicit in custodial questioning. "[W]e
will not pause to inquire in individual cases whether the defendant
was aware of his rights without a warning being given."" Warning
of the right to silence "at the time of interrogation is indispensable
108. Id. at 452.
109. I& at 461.
110. Id. at 458 n.26 (quotingArthur F. Sutherland, Jr., Crime and Confession, 79 HARv.
L. REV. 21, 37 (1965)).
111. id. at 457.
112. Id. at 468.
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to overcome its pressures and to insure that the individual knows
he is free to exercise the privilege at that point in time."11
A police-administered warning of the right to silence, although
necessary, was not sufficient. The suspect must have the right to
consult with counsel; but even this was thought insufficient
protection for the privilege. The suspect under Miranda has the
right to not only counsel's advice, but to the presence of counsel
during questioning." 4 As had been anticipated, given Gideon, the
right to counsel did not depend on either an affirmative request"'
or the ability to pay."6
Thus far the Miranda opinion tracks the ACLU brief. But the
Court would not take the final step. Amsterdam and Mishkin had
argued that "the Presence of Counsel is Required to Protect the
Subject's Privilege Against Self-Incrimination."" 7 In other words,
the suspect must see a lawyer before making an admissible
statement. But the Court ruled otherwise: "An express statement
that the individual is willing to make a statement and does not
want an attorney followed closely by a statement could constitute
a waiver."1 8
Waiver must be executed "knowingly and intelligently."" Waiver
was not to be "presumed simply from the silence of the accused
after warnings are given or simply from the fact that a confession
was in fact eventually obtained." 20 The government must carry the
"heavy burden"12 ' of proving waiver. But waiver there might be
without the intervention of counsel for the suspect.
The Miranda Court's waiver doctrine is plainly at odds with the
rest of the opinion. As Justice White demanded in dissent:
[I]fthe defendant may not answer without a warning a question
such as "Where were you last night?" without having his answer
be a compelled one, how can the Court ever accept his negative
113. Id. at 469.
114. Id. at 469-70.
115. Id. at 470-71.
116. Id. at 472-73.
117. ACLU Brief, supra note 85, at 22 (embhasis added).
118. Miranda, 384 U.S. at 475.
119. Id.
120. Id.
121. Id.
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answer to the question of whether he wants to consult his
retained counsel or counsel whom the court will appoint? 2
The majority made no answer.
The only explanation for the inconsistency in the Miranda
rules is concern for effective law enforcement. The Court purported
to deny that "society's need for interrogation outweighs the
privilege."m Yet Warren took pains to argue that the new rules
"should not constitute an undue interference with a proper
system of law enforcement."' The Miranda rules closely resemble
the contemporary practice of the FBI." 5 The effectiveness of the
FBI was unquestioned, enabling Warren to argue that the FBI
practice "can readily be emulated by state and local enforcement
agencies. " "s
It now should be apparent that Miranda was a maximalist
decision par excellence. On the dimension of width the opinion
openly prescribes rules of general applicability to thousands of
future cases. The dissenters emphasized this very point. There was
no proof in the record, Justice Clark protested, that the police
manuals cited by the Court were even taught, let alone applied, by
the police departments involved in the cases sub judice.12 Justice
Harlan scoffed at "the Court's new code,"128 and was nettlesome
enough to cite Warren's now thoroughly embarrassing concurrence
in Culombe."9
But Culombe itself is part of the justification for Miranda. The
Court's turn to a wide rule was based on decades of failed
experience with the case-by-case approach. The indeterminacy of
the voluntariness test meant that police had no incentive not to
press questioning until the suspect confessed. Who knows? However
great the pressure, the courts might admit the statement. On the
other hand, police attempting to comply with the test could never
122. Id. at 536 (White, J., dissenting).
123. Id. at 479.
124. Id. at 481.
125. Id. at 483-86.
126. Id. at 486. Chief Justice Warren evidently relied greatly on the FBI practice during
the Justices' deliberations, and this point weighed heavily with at least some of the Justices.
SCHWARTZ, supra note 98, at 589.
127. Miranda, 384 U.S. at 499 (Clark, J., dissenting).
128. Id. at 516 (Harlan, J., dissenting).
129. Id. at 508 (Harlan, J., dissenting).
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be sure that a court would accept their tactics, requiring retrial and
perhaps the loss of a meritorious conviction. Given the volume of
cases and the vagueness of the test, similarly situated defendants
inevitably were treated differently.
The need for a wide ruling was made even more urgent by the
confusion over the scope of Escobedo. Law enforcement agencies,
not civil liberties groups, wanted to know the limits of permissible
interrogation. Given the reversal of convictions as the remedy, the
need for stable rules upon which the police could rely was acute.
In the course of this experience-and experience prior to joining
the Court-the Justices had acquired a great deal of familiarity
with the confessions problem. When the Court did decide to clarify
the law, it undertook an exemplary process by reviewing a repre-
sentative sample of cases and taking briefs from a wide variety of
perspectives.
Finally, during these decades of experience, legislatures had
not taken steps to deal with the interrogation issue. At the level
of institutional competence, the Miranda Court could have con-
siderable confidence in its knowledge about the problem, and very
little confidence in legislative solutions. It was a textbook scenario
for a maximalist decision.
Even so, the Court tried to stimulate, rather than short-circuit,
the democratic process. The majority wrote that "the Constitution
does not require any specific code of procedures for protecting the
privilege against self-incrimination during custodial interro-
gation."3 0 The Miranda rules were only one alternative; Congress
or state legislatures could provide for other systems, "so long as
they are fully as effective"' in protecting the Fifth Amendment
privilege.
The Miranda Court could not avoid a deeply controversial
rationale. Although the case for clear rules in the confessions
context is very strong, the precise content of those rules is open to
reasonable debate. Given the absence of legislative efforts, the
Court had little choice but to turn to the Constitution. Given the
totality-of-the-circumstances approach embedded in the due process
130. Id. at 490.
131. Id. As Professor Weisselberg has shown, based on an exchange of memos between
Warren and Brennan, the language inMiranda about equally effective alternatives was not
intended to support treating the warnings specifically approved in Miranda as less than
constitutionally required. Weisselberg, supra note 10, at 123-25.
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cases, the Court likewise had little choice but to turn to the Bill of
Rights. And it could not turn to the Sixth Amendment without
crippling law enforcement.
The reliance on the Fifth Amendment, therefore, makes a great
deal of sense from a historical perspective. But the choice of the
Fifth Amendment privilege as the basis for a broad ruling on
confessions was necessarily unstable. Compulsion is not a self-
defining idea," 2 and many thoughtful people believe that compel-
ling confessions without brutality is justifiable.'33 Moreover, if
custody is inherently coercive, it is hard to see how the suspect can
make a voluntary waiver in a coercive environment. The Justices on
the Miranda Court could count on widespread support for a broad
rule, but they could not realistically have hoped for widespread
support of so deep a rationale. There was, however, no apparent
shallower alternative that could yield the needed wide rule.
HI. DICKERSON AS MINIMALISM
A The Cloud on Miranda: Why the Court Took the Case
1. itle II
During the 1960s, political opposition to the Court's criminal
procedure rulings had grown increasingly intense. In 1965,
President Johnson appointed a commission to study the crime
problem and recommend legislation to combat it. The Commission
132. Professor Sunstein himself seems to characterize the Miranda opinion as shallow.
See SUNST=I, supra note 15, at 262 ("Notably, it is possible to imagine decisions that are
shallow and broad; consider the Miranda rules, creating a virtual code of police behavior
without resolving the deepestissues about the meaning of'coercion.'"). Granted that Miranda
did not subscribe to a specific philosophical account ofcompulsion, the holdings that custodial
interrogation without safeguards constitutes compulsion per se, and that the suspect can
make a voluntary waiver under the same custodial pressure, were and remain intensely
controversial. It is possible that jurists entertaining diverse conceptions of compulsion can
agree on the Miranda rules, but it is equally true that jurists accepting the same conception
of compulsion may vigorously disagree about the Miranda rules. The justifying logic of the
Miranda opinion has not secured the support of an overlapping consensus, as the elegantly
evasive Dickerson opinion makes quite clear.
133. See, e.g., JEREMY BENTHAM, 5 RATIONALE OF JUDICIAL EVIDENCE 229 (1827); David
Dolinko, Is There a Rationale for the Privilege Against Self-Incrimination?, 33 UCLAL. REV.
1063 (1986); HenryJ. Friendly, The FifthAmendment Tomorrow: The Case for Constitutional
Change, 37 U. CIN. L. REV. 671 (1968).
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published its report in February of 1967.134 The majority saw the
causes of crime in social conditions, and the principal need in the
law-enforcement area to be increasing the resources and improving
the training available to police.3 5 A minority saw the Supreme
Court's recent decisions, Miranda foremost among them, as an aid
to crime and a major obstacle to law enforcement.'3 6
That same month the administration proposed a crime bill,
generally incorporating the recommendations of the Commission.137
Money was to be allocated to improve state and local law
enforcement. The administration bill included no provision autho-
rizing wiretapping or other electronic surveillance; nor did it
include any provisions designed to modify, let alone overturn,
Miranda.3
8
Both the House and Senate Judiciary Committees held hearings
on crime in the Spring of 1967.' Members returning from the
winter recess were keenly aware of an anticrime sentiment in the
country. Street crime, riots, and antiwar protests were lumped
together as a crisis in law-and-order. 40
The House approved a version of the administration proposal on
August 8, 1967.141 In the Senate, however, conservatives, led by
John McClellan and Sam Ervin (later to be lionized by liberals for
his role in exposing the Watergate conspiracy), pushed a modified
bill that directly attacked the Supreme Court's criminal procedure
revolution. 142
The bill reported out of the Senate Judiciary Committee provided
that any confession voluntarily made would be admissible in federal
court; a warning of rights or a demand for counsel were only factors
to be considered under the voluntariness standard.' This provision
134. The President's Commission on Law Enforcement andAdministration ofJustice, The
Challenge of Crime in a Free Society (1967).
135. See id.
136. See i&L at 303-07.
137. For the history of the bill that ultimately became the Omnibus Crime Control and
Safe Streets Act of 1968, see ADAM BRECKENRIDGE, CONGRESS AGAINST THE COURT 39-94
(1970); Kamisar, supra note 10, at 887-909.
138. See BRECKENRIDGE, supra note 137, at 47-50.
139. Id. at 50-72.
140. Id. at 75-94.
141. Id. at 74.
142. Id. at 75-94.
143. Id. at 69-72.
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flew in the face of Miranda. The bill at that point also included a
provision eliminating the jurisdiction of federal courts to reverse
state court criminal convictions because of the erroneous admission
of a confession, as well as a section gutting federal habeas review
of state convictions.'
The Senate debated the crime bill in May of 1968, in the wake of
Martin Luther King's assassination and the riots that followed.
Early in that month, Richard Nixon's campaign issued a major
policy paper, "Toward Freedom from Fear," exploiting the crime
issue and blaming the Court for "free[ing] patently guilty indi-
viduals on the basis of legal technicalities."4 ' On the floor, a scant
majority composed of fifty-two senators voted to delete the
jurisdiction-stripping provision. 46 Only fifty-four voted to delete the
habeas provision.' The bill was also amended to provide that the
Mallory rule would not apply until the suspect had been in custody
for six hours; and that even then, a confession might be received if
the delay in presentment was "reasonable."'
48
The Senate bill went to the House, which had thus far
deliberately rejected both wiretapping and direct attacks on the
Court. Robert Kennedy was assassinated on June 5. On June 6,
the House voted 369-17 to adopt the Senate bill, without a
conference.' 49 Lyndon Johnson, anxious to see his own. crime
program written into law, and aware of how the opposition party
would use a veto in the coming campaign, signed the bill into law
on June 19.
Whether its provisions were constitutional seems not to have
mattered much to the proponents. Rather, they seemed to hope that
the Justices themselves would either reverse Miranda or retire
and be replaced by justices who would.50 On June 26, President
Johnson announced the resignation of Earl Warren as Chief Justice.
Miranda, at that moment, stood as a four-to-four decision of the
144. Id.
145. The Nixon paper is reprinted at 114 CONG. REC. 12,936-37 (1968).
146. Id. at 14,177.
147. Id. at 14,183.
148. Id. at 14,174.
149. Id. at 16,299-300. The assassination increased support for the bill, even though
Robert Kennedy himself had opposed some of its provisions. See Kamisar, supra note 10, at
894 n.63.
150. E.g., BRECKENRIDGE, supra note 137, at 66 (quoting Sen. McClellan).
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Supreme Court, condemned in Congress, and the subject of bitter
criticism in a presidential campaign in which Richard Nixon was
widely favored. Nixon would prevail and appoint four Justices.
Nonetheless Miranda lives, although until the denouement last
term the issue was very much in doubt.
2. The Reaction Continued: The "Prophylactic Rules" Cases
Title II had no immediate impact on actual litigation because the
Department of Justice did not ask courts to enforce the statute.
Everyone simply assumed that while Miranda might be modified in
light of a serious alternative, such as tape-recording interrogations
or in-court questioning, only a constitutional amendment could
reinstate the old voluntariness test as the exclusive limit on
confessions. Nonetheless, a changed Supreme Court began to
undermine Miranda.
In a sequence of cases decided in the 1970s, the new majority
circumscribed the Miranda exclusionary rule. Statements obtained
from unwarned suspects were admitted to impeach; so too were
statements obtained from suspects who invoked their rights in
response to the warnings. The Court took a generous view of
the admissibility of the fruits of Miranda violations, such as the
identity of a prosecution witness or a subsequent confession. The
process began with Harris v. New York. 5' Viven Harris was
charged with selling heroin to a New Rochelle police officer on two
occasions, once on January 4 and once on January 7, 1966.152 On
151. 401 U.S. 222 (1971).
152. The discussion of the facts is based on the Supreme Court's opinion in Harris. In at
least one respect the Court's opinion is clearly wrong. The Court said that Harris "ma[de no
claim that the statements made to the police were coerced or involuntary." Id. at 224. If
Harris claimed that his statements were coerced as well as compelled, the case would have
had to be remanded for a determination of the coercion issue. In fact, Harris did raise the
coercion claim. Appellant's Brief for Certiorari, App. at 57, Harris v. New York, 401 U.S. 222
(1971) (No. 70-206) (stating to the trial judge that, to use statement to impeach, prosecution
"has to lay a foundation and show that it was voluntarily made, under the law, and in
conformity with the requirements as set up in the case of Miranda v. Arizona"). The petition
for certiorari clearly sets up the due process claim, independently of the Miranda claim. See
Appellant's Brief for Certiorari at 10, Harris (No. 70-206); see also Alan M. Dershowitz &
John Hart Ely, Harris v. New York. Some Anxious Observations on the Candor and Logic of
the Emerging Nixon Majority, 80 YALE L.J. 1198-99 (1971) (charging the majority with "at
best, gross negligence" concerning the record). The charge is harsh, but my own review of the
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January 7, he was arrested and interrogated, without being first
apprised of any right to consult with appointed counsel." From the
police standpoint, there was no reason for such a warning, because
Miranda had not yet been decided. In response to police questions,
Harris said he had purchased heroin from a third party at the
officer's direction and with money supplied by the officer.15'
At trial, the government did not offer the statement into
evidence, so no hearingwas held on its admissibility.155 Instead, the
officer testified that Harris had sold him heroin on January 4 and
6.156 The petitioner took the stand and testified that he had sold
nothing to the officer on January 4, and only baking powder on
January 6.1' On cross-examination, the prosecutor, over defense
objections, read the transcript of what Harris had said during the
police questioning, and asked Harris if he remembered making the
statements. 158
The Supreme Court framed the issue as whether the Constitution
permitted impeachment with statements obtained in violation of
Miranda.'59 The Miranda opinion had spoken to this issue and
indicated that statements obtained with the required warning and
waiver could not be used for impeachment."60 Moreover, unlike
evidence obtained in violation of the Fourth Amendment, the Fifth
Amendment condemns compelled self-incriminating testimony only
when it might be used at a later trial of the witness. Thus the use
in evidence seems to constitute a second violation of the Fifth
Amendment, independent of the compulsion to speak in the first
instance.
The Supreme Court nevertheless ruled that Miranda-tainted
statements may be admitted to impeach. Chief Justice Burger's
opinion reasoned that the passage from Miranda condemning
the use of unwarned statements for impeachment "was not at
all necessary to the Court's holding and cannot be regarded as
record indicates that the charge is substantiaUy justified.
153. Harris, 401 U.S. at 224.
154. Id. at 223.
155. Id.
156. Id.
157. Id.
158. Id.
159. Id. at 224.
160. Miranda v. Arizona, 384 U.S. 436,476-77 (1966).
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controlling." 6' Given the government's substantial interest in
preventing perjury,"' exclusion from the government case in chief
would suffice to deter future Miranda violations, for the police
cannot know in advance whether there will be a trial or whether the
defendant will testify if there is one.16
The essence of Miranda is the proposition that statements
obtained by custodial interrogation are presumed to be compelled
in violation of the Fifth Amendment. The Harris majority did not
overtly question this proposition. But as subsequent cases would
confirm, these same Justices would not permit any use, for
impeachment or otherwise, of a statement they regarded as
genuinely compelled, whether by overbearing interrogation methods
or by the threat of a contempt sanction. The Harris opinion's focus
on deterrence thus implicitly undermined the constitutional
foundation of Miranda.'64
In Mincey v. Arizona 6 the Court held that statements obtained
in violation of Miranda could not be used to impeach the
defendant's testimony when those statements also ran afoul of the
due process voluntariness test.166 All four Justices in the Harris
majority still serving joined the majority opinion. And in New
Jersey v. Portash"67 Justice Stewart wrote a majority opinion, joined
by Justice White, holding that testimony compelled under a grant
of immunity might not be used even to impeach the testimony of the
immunized witness at his subsequent criminal trial. 6 '
161. Harris, 401 U.S. at 224.
162. Id. at 226. The Court went further explaining-
If, for example, an accused confessed fully to a homicide and led the police to
the body of the victim under circumstances making his confession inadmissible,
the petitioner would have us allow that accused to take the stand and blandly
deny every fact disclosed to the police or discovered as a "fruit" of his confession,
free from confrontation with his prior statements and acts.
Id. at 225 n.2.
163. Id. at 225.
164. SeeArnoldH. LoewyPolice-ObtainedEvidenceAnd The Constitution:Distinguishing
Unconstitutionally Obtained Evidence From Unconstitutionally Used Evidence, 87 MIcH. L.
REV. 907, 926 (1989) (tracing "illegitimate prophylactic rationale" to Harris v. New York).
165. 437 U.S. 385 (1978).
166. Id.
167. 440 U.S. 450 (1979).
168. Blackmun, joined by Chief Justice Burger, dissented on a procedural ground. After
the trial court refused to grant Portash's motion to forbid impeachment with the immunized
testimony, Portash elected not to testify. In Blackmun's view, the failure to testify deprived
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The second case in which the Supreme Court has approved the
admission of a statement tainted by a Miranda violation is Oregon
v. Hass.'69 After receiving Miranda warnings, Hass asked for a
lawyer. 70 The police, however, continued questioning, and the
answers Hass gave were admitted at his trial to impeach his
testimony.17' Hass, unlike Harris, actually asserted his right to
terminate questioning under Miranda. In such a case, the police
have nothing to lose by questioning illegally; the impeachment
exception gives them a positive incentive to do so. Nonetheless, in
Hass the Burger Court again dismissed this incentive effect as
"speculative" and permitted the impeachment.'72
The Court adopted the "prophylactic rules" characterization to
help justify admitting the fruits of a Miranda violation in Michigan
v. Tucker.7 3 Tucker was arrested for rape a few months before the
Supreme Court's decision in Miranda.74 The police advised him of
the right to silence and to counsel, but did not advise him of his
right to have counsel appointed if he were indigent. 7 Tucker told
the police he understood the rights they had told him about and
made a statement to the effect that he had been with one
Henderson at the time of the rape.'76 When police interviewed
Henderson, he told police that Tucker had left his company early
enough to have committed the crime.177 Henderson also told the
police that he had seen Tucker the next day with scratches on his
face and that Tucker had made some incriminating statements at
that time. 7
8
the reviewing courts of a concrete factual context in which to examine the effect of
impeachment with previously compelled testimony. See id. at 463-71 (Blackmun, J.,
dissenting). But neither of these two members oftheHarris majority hinted that the Portash
Court reached the wrong result.
169. 420 U.S. 714 (1975).
170. IdM at 715.
171. Id- at 716.
172. I& at 723.
173. 417 U.S. 433 (1974).
174. Id. at 435.
175. Id-
176. Id. at 436.
177. Id.
178. I&
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The trial court suppressed Tucker's statements but not
Henderson's testimony.179 The Michigan courts affirmed the
conviction, but a federal district judge granted Tucker's petition for
habeas corpus. 8 ° The Sixth Circuit affirmed the district court, but
the Supreme Court reversed, holding that Henderson's testimony
was admissible."' In reaching this result, the Court relied partly
on the good faith of the police and partly on the characterization of
the Miranda rules as "not themselves rights protected by the
Constitution."" 2
The Court took a similar tack in Oregon v. Elstad.'" Elstad was
suspected of burglary and arrested at his home in the presence of
his mother. Without givingMiranda warnings the police questioned
him briefly and he admitted that he had been present at the scene
during the crime. An hour later, at the police station, Elstad
received the Miranda warnings, waived them, and made a written
confession. The Oregon courts suppressed both the initial admission
and the subsequent confession.'84
The Supreme Court reversed. The opinion rejected the analogy to
Fourth Amendment fruits analysis in the context of successive
admissions, but it did not hold that evidence derived from a
Miranda violation is automatically admissible. 85 The Oregon court
had in effect presumed that a tainted statement made a subsequent
voluntary statement impossible for an extended period of time.'
Then-Associate Justice Rehnquist wrote for the majority that "[w] e
hold today that a suspect who has once responded to unwarned yet
uncoercive questioning is not thereby disabled from waiving his
rights and confessing after he has been given the requisite Miranda
"187warnings.
Whether an unwarned admission in fact undermines the
voluntariness of a subsequent Miranda waiver is a question of fact.
"As in any such inquiry, the finder of fact must examine the
179. Id. at 437.
180. Id.
181. Id. at 438.
182. Id. at 444.
183. 470 U.S. 298 (1985).
184. Id. at 299.
185. Id. at 318.
186. See State v. Elstad, 658 P.2d 552, 554 (Or. 1983).
187. Elstad, 470 U.S. at 318.
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surrounding circumstances and the entire course of police conduct
with respect to the suspect in evaluating the voluntariness of his
statements."188 There was no evidence in Elstad that the police
exploited the admission or otherwise pressured the suspect into
waiving his rights at the station.
Tucker and Elstad stand in contrast to Kastigar v. United
States,"9 which upheld the constitutionality of use-plus-fruitsimlmnty for testimony compelled by formal process before a grand
jury.90 The Kastigar opinion clearly indicates that immunity would
not be constitutional if evidence derived from compelled testimony
were admissible. 9' Moreover, the Court has taken abroad approach
to excluding the fruits of coerced confessions. 19 2
Thus the characterization of Miranda as subconstitutional was
a central part of the rationale in the impeachment and fruits cases.
During this same time frame, the Court was holding that when self-
incriminating testimony is clearly compelled-by formal process
under an immunity order-the resulting statements may not be
admitted to impeach and their fruits must be scrupulously
excluded. Apparently "real" compulsion called for one exclusionary
rule while Miranda called for something else.
Legal scholars have repeatedly pointed out that the prophylactic-
rule characterization went far beyond justifying a narrow ex-
clusionary rule in Miranda cases. 93 If the Miranda rules were
not constitutionally required, and if the Court has no supervisory
power over state courts, Miranda itself-which reversed a state
188. Id.
189. 406 U.S. 441 (1972).
190. Id.
191. See id.
192. For a discussion ofthe tensionwith the coerced confession cases, see Elstad, 470 U.S.
at 324-28 (Brennan, J., dissenting).
193. See, e.g., JOSEPH D. GRANO, CONFESSIONS, TRUTH, AND THE LAW 218 (1993) ("The
current situation is doctrinally unstable, with two lines of irreconcilable cases coexisting to
give the Court a choice between allowing or disallowing the police to have the necessary tools
for effective interrogation."); Martin R. Gardner, Section 1983 Actions Under Miranda: A
Critical View of the Right to Avoid Interrogation, 30 Am. CRIM. L. Rsv. 1277, 1291 (1993)
("Harris, Tucker, and Quarles have been roundly criticized as inconsistent with essential
aspects of Miranda."); Herman, supra note 14, at 740 ("Decisions such as Tucker, Quarles,
and Elstad cut the doctrinal heart out of Miranda."); Geoffrey R. Stone, The Miranda
Doctrine in the Burger Court, 1977 Sup. CT. REv. 99, 123 ("Tucker seems certainly to have
laid the groundwork to overrule Miranda.").
WILLIAM AND MARY LAW REVIEW
conviction-would be indefensible. Yet the Court never took the
final plunge of overruling Miranda.
In 1977, in a case involving the rape and murder of a ten-year old
girl on Christmas Eve, twenty-one states asked the Court to
overrule Miranda.' The Court declined the invitation and
reversed the conviction on Sixth Amendment grounds. 9 ' Shortly
thereafter the Court breathed new life into Miranda by holding that
once a suspect invokes the right to counsel, the fruits of subsequent
questioning following an otherwise valid waiver must be sup-
pressed. 9 ' Justice Stewart wrote the Williams opinion passing over
the states' request that Miranda be overruled. Justice White wrote
the Edwards opinion adopting a rigid bar on post-invocation
reinterrogation. Prior to retirement, Justice Harlan voted to reverse
a conviction on Miranda grounds, although he continued to criticize
Miranda itself. 9 ' Thus by 1980, the three Miranda dissenters
whose service on the Court extended into the 1970s had all, to a
greater or lesser extent, reconciled themselves to the Miranda
framework.
Nonetheless, the Court's opinions continued to characterize
Miranda as not constitutionally required, most notably in the 1984
public safety exception case.' 98 Yet the Court also continued to
reverse state convictions on Miranda grounds, going so far as to
hold that Miranda violations are cognizable on federal habeas
corpus petitions by state prisoners.'99 Legal commentators who
agree on little else agreed that something had to give; either the
194. Brewer v. Williams, 430 U.S. 387 (1977). For the submission of the states, see Brief
for Amici Curiae of Americans for Effective Law Enforcement, Inc., et al. at 1, Williams, 430
U.S. 387 (No. 74-1263).
195. Williams, 430 U.S. at 387.
196. Edwards v. Arizona, 451 U.S. 477 (1981).
197. See Orozco v. Texas, 394 U.S. 324, 327-28 (1969) (Harlan, J., concurring) (joining
majority opinion reversing conviction on Miranda grounds but expressing continued
disagreement with merits of Miranda doctrine).
198. New York v. Quarles, 467 U.S. 649 (1984) (recognizing public safety exception to
Miranda when police in emergency situation question suspect about location of firearm in
public place in immediate aftermath of chase).
199. See, e.g., Thompson v. Keohane, 516 U.S. 99 (1995) (reversing denial of state
prisoner's petition for habeas based on Miranda violation because lower federal courts
erroneously presumed state-court factual findings correct); Withrow v. Williams, 507 U.S.
680 (1993) (holding that Miranda violations are cognizable on federal habeas petitions by
state prisoners).
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Court should accept Miranda's constitutional stature or the Court
should get out of the business of reversing state convictions without
constitutional authority for doing so.200
When the United States Attorney's office raised the statute
before the district court in the Dickerson case, matters came to a
head. The District Court refused to regard Miranda as overruled.
The Justice Department reigned in the local office, but the Fourth
Circuit nonetheless reached the Title II issue and held that
the prophylactic-rules cases implicitly overruled Miranda."1 The
Fourth Circuit majority, over a temperate but extremely cogent
dissent, simply ignored the state Miranda cases. The Justice
Department, now in the posture of defending Miranda, supported
the defendant's petition for certiorari. Once the Court granted the
petition in December of 1999, court-watchers knew the hour had
come. At long last the Court would have to either repudiate
Miranda, repudiate the prophylactic-rule cases, or offer some in-
genious reconciliation of the two lines of precedent. The Supreme
Court of the United States, however, doesn't "have to" do anything,
as the decision in Dickerson once again reminds us.
B. The Opinion and the Dissent
Chief Justice Rehnquist's opinion squarely but sparely disposed
of the issue before the Court. The majority began by reviewing
the history of the Due Process test and how the Miranda decision
had created a Fifth Amendment limit in addition to the old volun-
tariness test. Agreeing with the court below that Title II was
intended to repudiate, and was in fact inconsistent with, Miranda,
the majority stated the issue as follows:
Because ofthe obvious conflict between our decision inMiranda
and § 3501, we must address whether Congress has consti-
tutional authority to thus supersede Miranda. If Congress has
such authority, § 3501's totality-of-the-circumstances approach
200. For example, Professor Grano, a prominent critic of Miranda, regards the
prophylactic-rules cases and the state Miranda cases as "irreconcilable." Grano, supra note
193, at 218. Professor Herman, a prominent defender of Miranda, agrees that the
prophylactic-rules cases "cut the doctrinal heart out of Miranda." Herman, supra note 14, at
740.
201. United States v. Dickerson, 166 F.3d 667, 695 (1999), rev'd 530 U.S. 428 (2000).
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must prevail over Miranda's requirement of warnings; if not,
that section must yield to Miranda's more specific require-
ments.0 2
The Chief Justice then resolved this issue in favor of Miranda and
against the statute.
The majority placed primary emphasis on the application of
the Miranda doctrine to the states.2 0 ' The majority also relied
on language in Miranda04 and subsequent cases,0 5 and on the
Miranda Court's insistence that legislative alternatives to the
Miranda warnings must be "at least as effective" at dispelling the
inherent coercion of custodial interrogation.0 ' The opinion repeat-
edly concludes thatMiranda is indeed "a constitutional decision,"207
"of constitutional origin, "2 and "is constitutionallybased." 211 Thus,
unless Miranda were to be overruled, Title II must be struck down.
The majoritywas unwilling to overruleMiranda. "Whether or not
we would agree with Miranda's reasoning and its resulting rule,
were we addressing the issue in the first instance, the principles of
stare decisis weigh heavily against overruling it now."2 10 Miranda
has gone beyond mere precedent and "become embedded in routine
police practice to the point where the warnings have become part of
our national culture."2 1 '
As for the prophylactic-rules cases, the majority opines that they:
illustrate the principle-not that Miranda is not a consti-
tutional rule-but that no constitutional rule is immutable. No
court laying down a general rule can possibly foresee the
various circumstances in which counsel will seek to apply it,
and the sort of modifications represented by these cases are as
much a normal part of constitutional law as the original
decision.212
202. Dickerson, 530 U.S. at 437.
203. Id. at 437-38.
204. Id.
205. Id. at 440 n.5.
206. Id. at 440.
207. Id.
208. Id. at 439 n.3.
209. Id. at 440.
210. Id. at443.
211. Id.
212. Id. at 441.
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The Chief Justice fails to point out that the Miranda majority
indeed foresaw-and condemned-the use ofunwarned statements
for impeachment purposes."' Nor does he deign to notice the
holding in Portash barring impeachment use of immunized grand
jury testimony. Evidently unexplained, apparently arbitrary dis-
tinctions are, for the Chief Justice, "a normal part of consti-tutional
law."21
4
The Dickerson majority did attempt to explain Elstad 215 on the
theory that "refusing to apply the traditional 'fruits' doctrine
developed in Fourth Amendment cases ... simply recognizes the
fact the unreasonable searches under the Fourth Amendment
are different from unwarned interrogation under the Fifth
Amendment."216 The Chief Justice must know, however, that the
Fifth Amendment exclusionary rule for fruits under Kastigar is
more strict, not more lax, than the Fourth Amendment exclusionary
rule.217 The difference between the Fourth Amendment and Fifth
Amendment exclusionary rules cuts against' not in favor of,
reconciling Elstad with Miranda, Dickerson, and Kastigar.
The Chief Justice's decision to join the majority, the absence of
concurring opinions, and the opinion's greater overall concern for
the Court's authority relative to Congress than to the coherence of
the Court-made law all point to a compromise decision. The
apparent gist of that compromise is that the status quo will be
maintained. The existing law, however, is regarded by virtually
every informed observer as inconsistent and unprincipled.21
213. Miranda v. Arizona, 384 U.S. 436, 477 (1966) ("[Statements merely intended to be
exculpatory by the defendant are often used to impeach his testimony at trial or to
demonstrate untruths in the statement given under interrogation and thus to prove guilt by
implication. These statements are incriminating in any meaningful sense of the word and
may not be used without the full warnings and effective waiver required for any other
statement.").
214. Dickerson, 530 U.S. at 441.
215. See supra notes 183-88 and accompanying text.
216. Dickerson, 530 U.S. at 441.
217. Compare United States v. North, 920 F.2d 940 (D.C. Cir. 1990) (excluding testimony
of witnesses whose memories might have been refreshed by compelled testimony televised
under an immunity order), with Rawlings v. Kentucky, 448 U.S. 98 (1980) (admitting
statements made 45 minutes after illegal detention when Miranda warnings and discovery
of incriminating physical evidence took place between initiation of detention and time
statements were made).
218. To cite but two ofthe most prominent examples, Yale Kamisar agrees with Geoffrey
Stone that the prophylactic-rules cases are "flatly inconsistent" with Miranda. See Yale
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Justice Scalia's dissenting opinionjoined by Justice Thomas, will
be taken up in detail later in this Article. It is worth noting here,
however, that the dissent accurately targets the majority's refusal
to face up to the Court's inconsistent pronouncements about
Miranda. In a particularly telling salvo, Justice Scalia notes that
the Dickerson majority seems to give itself the power to declare
constitutional rules that go beyond the Constitution, when the
Court has denied Congress any such power despite the textual
authority given to Congress by Section Five of the Fourteenth
Amendment.1 9
C. Dickerson's Minimalism
1. Width
On the width dimension, the Chief Justice's opinion pointedly
avoids calling the impeachment and fruits cases into question. Yet
if Miranda is "based on the Constitution," and if the only apparent
constitutional basis is the Fifth Amendment privilege, it would
seem to follow that Miranda violations are violations of the Fifth
Amendment. If Miranda violations are Fifth Amendment violations,
then Miranda-tainted statements should not be admitted to
impeach or permitted to yield admissible fruits.
Thus Dickerson's holding logically calls into question the holdings
in Harris, Hass, Tucker and Elstad. But the opinion does not
purport to repudiate those decisions, or to reconcile them with
Miranda's reaffirmed constitutional stature. The Court has indeed
left some things undecided.
Consider what might happen in Dickerson's case on remand.
The district court suppressed Dickerson's statement on Miranda
grounds, but refused to suppress a statement made by an accom-
plice named in Dickerson's confession. 221 This seems like a correct
Kamisar, On the Fruits of Miranda Violations, Coerced Confessions, and Compelled
Testimony, 93 MICH. L. REV. 929, 945 n.66 (1995) (I share Professor (now Provost) Stone's
conclusion that the view that a violation of the Self-Incrimination Clause occurs only if a
confession is hivoluntary' under pre-Miranda standards 'is an outright rejection of the core
premises of Miranda' and'is flatly inconsistent with the Court's declaration in Miranda that
'[tihe requirement of warnings and waiver of rights is a fundamental with respect to the
Fifth Amendment privilege.") (quoting Stone, supra note 193, at 118-19).
219. Dickerson, 530 U.S. at 450-51 (Scalia, J., dissenting).
220. See United States v. Dickerson, 166 F.3d 667,676 (4th Cir. 1999), reu'd 530 U.S. 428
[Vol. 43:1
20011 CONSTITUTIONAL THEORY FOR CRIMINAL PROCEDURE 37
application of Tucker; indeed the district court relied on an even
harsher fruits decision in which the Fourth Circuit held that
derivative evidence will never be suppressed onMiranda grounds.221
Surely on remand Dickerson would be within his rights to seek a
reconsideration of this ruling, for if the Supreme Court's decision
means that Miranda violations are Fifth Amendment violations,
Kastigar applies rather than Tucker.222 The Court's opinion in
Dickerson invites this claim but gives no guidance as to how it
should be resolved.
Suppose further that Dickerson goes to trial and elects to testify
in his own defense. Harris squarely holds that his Miranda-tainted
statement is admissible to impeach, but Portash holds that a
genuinely compelled admission may not be used to impeach. If
Dickerson equates Miranda violations with compelled testimony,
Portash ought to apply rather than Harris. Again, the Dickerson
opinion invites this claim but gives no guidance as to how it should
be resolved.
If, in contrast, Dickerson leaves Harris and Tucker undisturbed,
the prosecution will soon be making converse arguments in grand
jury cases. Because Dickerson equates Miranda violations with
compelled testimony, the argument would run, it follows that
evidence derived from compelled testimony under an immunity
order ought to be admissible under Tucker and Elstad. Likewise, a
defendant's immunized grand jury testimony should be admissible
to impeach under Harris and Hass.
(2000) ("Although the district court suppressed the statement obtained in violation of
Miranda, it nevertheless denied Dickerson's motion to suppress the evidence found as a
result thereof, e.g., the statement made by Rochester identifying Dickerson as the getaway
driver.").
221. United States v. Elie, 111 F.3d 1135, 1140-41 (4th Cir. 1997) (holding that the fruit
of poisonous tree doctrine does not apply to Miranda violations).
222. The Blie opinion relies wholly on propositions that must be regarded as inoperative
since the Supreme Court's decision in Dickerson:
Although the Supreme Court has not specifically rejected application of the
"fruit of the poisonous tree" doctrine to physical evidence discovered as the
result of a statement obtained in violation of Miranda, it is clear to us that the
Courts reasoning in Tucker and Elstad compels that result. ... The holdings in
Tucker and Elstad could not be any clearer- the "tainted fruits" analysis applies
only when a defendant's constitutional rights have been infringed.... It is well
established that the failure to deliver Miranda warnings is not itself a
constitutional violation.
Id. at 1141-42 (footnotes and citations omitted).
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Perhaps, as I have argued in a prior paper, foxy lawyer's
arguments can square the impeachment and fruits cases in the
Miranda and grand jury contexts even on the assumption that
Miranda violations are Fifth Amendment violations.223 Such
arguments are not inevitable, but they are not impossible either.
The Dickerson opinion, however, in true minimalist fashion, leaves
all such considerations for another day.
2. Depth
If Dickerson in context should be seen as narrow, there can be
no doubt whatsoever that the opinion is shallow. The majority
never once addresses the thesis that custodial interrogation is
tantamount to compulsion. The entire focus of the opinion is on
precedent, about the shallowest justification in the domain of legal
rhetoric. Almost everybody agrees on at least a limited form of stare
decisis,124 but the spillover effect of a decision based on precedent
is minimal. -Justice Stevens, who believes Miranda is correct on
principle, can join the Chief Justice, who believes that Miranda is
wrong on principle, in deciding not to overrule Miranda whatever
its original merits. Still other Justices can spare themselves the
labor of forming an opinion on Miranda's merits by regarding the
existing doctrine as too well-settled to be reconsidered.
Most importantly, the Dickerson opinion does not address the
tension in the case law that brought the case before the Court in the
first place. Miranda states "a constitutional rule,"' but the cases
treating it as something less are "a normal part of constitutional
law."2 6 One can appreciate the skill with which the opinion evades
223. Donald Dripps,Is the Miranda Caselaw Really Inconsistent?, 17 CONST. COMMENT 19
(2000).
224. See, e.g., ANTONIN SCALIA, AMATTEROF INTERPRETATION: FEDERALCOURTSAND THE
LAW 138-39 (1998) ("Originalism, like any other theory of interpretation put into practice in
an ongoing system of law, must accommodate the doctrine of stare decisis; it cannot remake
the world anew."). There are skeptics of precedent in constitutional law. See Gary Lawson,
The Constitutional Case Against Precedent, 17 HARv. J. L. & PUB. POLY 23 (1994); Michael
Stokes Paulsen,Abrogating Stare Decisis by Statute: May Congress Remove the Precedential
Effect of Roe and Casey?, 109YALEL.J. 1535 (2000), butthus fartheyinclude only academics
characterized by exceptional originality of mind.
225. Dickerson, 530 U.S. at 444.
226. Id. at 441.
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the issue without losing sight of the fact that the issue has indeed
been evaded.
In a way, Dickerson and Miranda reflect a paradigmatic differ-
ence between the criminal procedure jurisprudence of the Warren
Court on the one hand and the Burger and Rehnquist Courts on the
other. At least with respect to the Fifth and Sixth Amendments, the
Warren Court maximized and the Burger and Rehnquist Courts
have minimized. The resulting body of doctrine is shot through with
inconsistencies and arbitrary distinctions. Subsequent majorities
have not repudiated the wide rulings and deep rationales of the
Warren Court. They have not faithfully followed them either.
Rather, floating majorities have qualified the broad rulings of the
Warren Court according to ad hoc balances of competing interests.
Coherence and consistency have suffered accordingly.
The next section locates the roots of this odd situation in the
peculiar institutional context of criminal procedure. The high
volume of constitutional cases and the absence of constructive
legislative activity call for wide, rather than narrow, rulings. The
justifications for such rulings, however, are problematic, based on
controversial doctrinal, factual, and moral premises. A return to
case-by-case adjudication is highly unattractive, but broad agree-
ment on the content of bright-line rules is not forthcoming. What to
do about the situation is a bit of a poser. But diagnosis comes first,
prescription second.
IV. WIDTH AND DEPTH IN CRIMINAL PROCEDURE CASES
A. The Case for Width in Criminal Procedure Doctrine
Let us briefly recall Professor Sunstein's list of contextual factors
that call for wide, rather than narrow,judicial rulings. When people
need to rely on a legal rule in a large number of cases, when the
elected branches of government are not likely to supply appropriate
rules, and when the judges are relatively confident of their own
policy preferences, the case for wide rulings is strongest. These
contextual factors are the norm, not the exception, in criminal
procedure cases.
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On policy grounds, the case for general rules governing criminal
procedure is overwhelming. 27 The volume of cases presenting
constitutional issues, and the need to supply police and lower courts
with reliable guidance, weigh strongly in the direction of rule-like
opinions.22 If police and lower courts can not tell what the law is,
illegal searches, interrogations, and trial practices will take place
needlessly, followed by the equally needless reversal of convictions
thereby obtained.
In 1998, the most recent year for which statistics are available,
there were more than fifteen million arrests in the United States. 29
In making these arrest decisions, law enforcement officers need to
know the limits of their authority. If they exceed it, not only are the
rights of citizens violated, but the sanction may be the exclusion of
any evidence thereby discovered. In the millions of these arrests
resulting in formal charges, prosecutors, defense lawyers, and trial
judges need to know both the constitutional limits on the police and
the constitutional requirements applicable to the trial process.
Narrow, fact-bound rulings leave the actors in the criminal process
without the guidance they need.
The case for clear rules to govern distinct categories of cases
was made most prominently by Anthony Amsterdam and Wayne
LaFave. ° Professor LaFave has since articulated sensible prin-
ciples for evaluating a proposed bright-line rule:
(1) Does it have clear and certain boundaries, so that it in fact
makes unnecessary case-by-case evaluation and adjudication?
(2) Does it produce results approximating those which would be
obtained if accurate case-by-case application of the underlying
227. There is a large literature comparing and contrasting rules and standards. See, e.g.,
FREDERICK SCHAUER, PLAYING BY THE RULES: A PHLosoPmcAL EXAMINATION OF RULE-
BASED DECISIONMAKING IN LAW AND IN LIFE (1991); Colin Diver, The Optimal Precision of
Administrative Rules, 93 YALE L.J. 65 (1983); Duncan Kennedy, Form and Substance in
Private Law Adjudication, 89 HARv. L. REv. 1685 (1976). An early contribution focusing on
rule-making by the police is KENNETH CULP DAVIS, DISCRETIONARYJUSTICE: APRELIMINARY
INQUIRY (1969).
228. See Louis Kaplow, Rules Versus Standards:An Economic Analysis 42 DUKE L.J. 557
(1992).
229. U.S. DEP'TOFJUSTICE, SOURCEBOOKOF CRIMINALJUSTICE STATISTICS 1998 at 328 tbl.
4.1 (Kathleen Maguire et al. eds., 1999).
230. E.g., Anthony Amsterdam, Perspectives on the FourthAmendment, 58 MINN. L. REV.
349, 378-91 (1974); Wayne LaFave, "Case by Case Adjudication" Versus "Standardized
Procedures: The Robinson Dilemma, 1974 SUP. CT. REV. 127, 141.
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principle were possible? (3) Is it responsible to a genuine need
to forego case-by-case application of a principle because that
approach has proved unworkable? (4) Is it not readily subject to
manipulation and abuse?"'
The case for bright-line rules has been challenged by Albert
Alschuler, Craig Bradley, and Chris Slobogin." 2 In one way or
another, each questions the feasibility, rather than the desirability,
of the LaFave criteria. The skeptics make some important points,
but I believe the case for bright-line rules remains powerfully
convincing.
Professor Alschuler argues that the Fourth Amendment posits
a negligence-type standard that is largely irreducible. Therefore,
"abandoning the judging of categories, courts should resume
the judging of cases."233 Whenever possible, reasonableness should
be determined ex ante by neutral judges, but when Fourth
Amendment claims are litigated ex post the courts should aim to
inculcate basic Fourth Amendment norms, parable style, by case
specific rulings." On Alschuler's account, a comprehensive code of
criminal procedure would be a disaster, even if written by legis-
latures or the police themselves, because the cases involve too many
variables to be categorized coherently.
Professor Bradley makes the more modest claim that the
Supreme Court is incapable of formulating comprehensive and
comprehensible rulesY 5 He vigorously defends rules, but insists
that only an administrative agency could succeed in drafting
them.2
6
Professor Slobogin takes the Alschuler view, but with an
important, and in my view, critical, shift in emphasis. Slobogin
emphasizes the indeterminacy of the probable cause and reasonable
suspicion standards, fairly noting that these amorphous criteria are
231. WAYNE LAFAVE, 3 SEARCH AND SEIZURE: A TREATISE ON THE FOURTH AMENDMENT §
7.1(c), at 446 (3d ed. 1996).
232. See CRAIG BRADLEY, THE FAiLURE OF THE CIMmI JUSTICE REVOLUTION (1993);
Albert W. Alschuler, Bright Line Fever and the Fourth Amendment, 45 U. Prrr. L. REV. 227
(1984); Christopher Slobogin, The World Without a Fourth Amendment, 39 UCLAL. REV. 1
(1991).
233. Alschuler, supra note 232, at 288.
234. Id.
235. BRADLEY, supra note 232, at 5.
236. Id. at 144.
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not rules at all but rather standards that are applied with
something less than consistency. 3 Slobogin himself, however,
seems to favor rules that specify the standard of suspicion required
to justify particular categories of intrusion on individual liberty.8
We need to distinguish carefully the judicial capability to
formulate clear rules from the content of those rules. Obviously a
vague standard is better than a rule that clearly requires the wrong
result in every case. Leaving the merits of the particular doctrines
aside, I think the Supreme Court's decisions in Miranda, New York
v. Belton,2"9 and Terry v. Ohio' illustrate both the potential and
the limit for formulating bright line rules in criminal procedure
cases.
Miranda held that custody, together with interrogation, amounts
to unconstitutional compulsion absent the warnings or other safe-
guards. Subsequent cases have clarified the concepts of custody,
interrogation, waiver, invocation, and initiation, as well as defining
exceptions for traffic stops, booking questions, and emergencies.
There are some anomalies in these cases, but on the whole, the law
of interrogation under Miranda is reasonably clear and generally
well-understood by the police.241
Professor Bradley concedes that Miranda stands as an example
of the Court formulating the sorts of rules he favors. 42 Now
Miranda was an exceptional case, a self-conscious exercise in
judicial lawmaking, based on long experience with the confessions
problem, and illuminated by the facts of several cases, state and
federal, taken from across the country. The Court should do more
of that. Given the volume of criminal litigation, it should be as
possible to consider several cases together in the Fourth and Sixth
Amendment contexts as in the Fifth Amendment context. Better
bright-line rules might have come from such a process than some of
the ones the Court has produced. If the issue is stated as the
237. Slobogin, supra note 232, at 72.
238. Id. at 74 n.237.
239. 453 U.S. 454 (1981).
240. 392 U.S. 1 (1968).
241. As the ChiefJustice noted in Dickerson, "experience suggests thatthe totality-of-the-
circumstances test, which § 3501 seeks to revive is more difficult than Miranda for law
enforcement officers to conform to, and for courts to apply in a consistent manner." Dickerson
v. United States, 530 U.S. 428,444 (2000).
242. Craig Bradley & Joseph Hoffmann, Public Perception, Justice, and the "Search for
Truth" in Criminal Justice, 69 S. CAL. L. REV. 1267, 1278 n.32 (1996).
[Vol. 43:1
20011 CONSTITUTIONAL THEORY FOR CRIMINAL PROCEDURE 43
capacity of the Court to formulate general rules that provide clear
guidance to police, however, Miranda offers a powerful example of
that very capacity.
24
Perhaps Miranda's success reflects the relative homogeneity
of interrogation cases, in contrast to the more various and more
dynamic context of Fourth Amendment issues. A useful comparison
can therefore be made between Miranda and New York v. Belton,2"
which held that incident to the lawful arrest of an occupant of a
motor vehicle, police may search both the arrested person and the
passenger compartment of the vehicle (including any containers
therein) without warrant or probable cause to search for evidence.
Few of those enamored of Miranda favor Belton, and vice versa, but
both cases announced rules that can (and are) followed in the vast
bulk of actual cases.
Critics of Belton, beginning with Justice Brennan's dissent, and
including both Professor Alschuler and Professor LaFave, have
pointed out that the Belton rule left some uncertainties about the
scope of search incident to the arrest of a vehicle occupant. 245 All
rules leave some uncertainties-what H.LA. Hart called the area
of "open texture."2" As Professor Alschuler points out, Belton does
not determine the scope of a search incident to an arrest on board
a cabin cruiser.' This is not a point that has caused much
consternation among police or trial judges, because arrests on cabin
cruisers are quite rare.
Experience has shown that the early critics overstated the
residual uncertainties of the Belton rule. Apparently unanimous
judicial authority holds that the search permitted under Belton
extends to the areas of hatchbacks, campers and such that are
accessible without leaving the passenger compartment of the
vehicle, and to the glove compartment, whether locked or un-
locked. 2' The cases are equally uniform in prohibiting search-
243. Professor Alschuler, for example, finds Miranda clear enough to deliver a biting
disparagement of the Burger Court's infidelities to that decision. See Albert W. Alschuler,
Failed Pragmatism. Reflections on the Burger Court, 100 HARv. L. REV. 1436, 1442 (1987).
244. 453 U.S. 454 (1981).
245. See id. at 470 (Brennan, J., dissenting); Alachuler, supra note 232 at 281-82; Wayne
LaFave, The Fourth Amendment in an Imperfect World: On Drawing "Bright Lines" and
'Good Faith", 43 U. Prrr. L. REv. 307,326 (1982).
246. H.L.A. HART, THE CONCEPT OF LAW, ch. VII (1961).
247. Alschuler, supra note 232, at 286.
248. LAFAVE, supra note 232 § 7.1(c), at 451 n.86, 452 n.88 (3d ed. 1996).
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incident-to-arrest of an automobile trunk that can be accessed only
by leaving the vehicle, absent probable cause to search the trunk for
evidence.249 Respecting the time frame for executing the Belton
search, Professor LaFave sensibly points out that "the fact that in
almost all cases the search will be undertaken at the place of arrest
is, as a practical matter, likely to overcome any problems as to
temporal proximity."20 Belton is overbroad and invites arrests
made for the ulterior purpose of searching a car, but in the main it
has provided a reasonably determinate rule."s Other rules might
have been better and at least as clear, but Belton no less than
Miranda illustrates the Court's capacity for formulating rules.
Terry v. Ohio 2 and its progeny, holding that the police may
detain suspects briefly for investigation under the so-called
"reasonable suspicion" standard, mark the limit of the desirability
of doctrinal rules. As Professor Slobogin pointed out, the difficulty
of articulating precise rules is much greater with respect to the
quantum of suspicion required to justify police intrusion than with
respect to when the police need a warrant or are required to
administer the Miranda warning. Here the factual variations
between cases become so pronounced that efforts at categorization
are essentially counterfactual. Every datum known to the police
alters the ex ante probability that a proposed search or arrest is
justified, which makes standards preferable to rules in this context.
Terry recognized as much, holding that in all cases within a definite
category of police behavior-the stop for investigation-the police
must satisfy a general standard. Like Professor Stuntz, 3 I am less
skeptical about the determinacy of the probable cause and reason-
able suspicion standards than Professor Slobogin; but no one would
classify "probable cause" or "reasonable suspicion" as a rule rather
than a standard.
249. Id. at 451 n.86.
250. Id. at 448.
251. This is the conclusion of a survey of the cases conducted six years after the decision.
See David M. Silk, Comment, When Bright Lines Break Down: Limiting New Yorkv. Belton,
136 U. PA. L. REV. 281 (1987).
252. 392 U.S. 1 (1968). For general exegesis of the Terry doctrine, see WAYNE R. LAFAVE,
4 SEARCHAND SEIzURE: A TREATIsE ON THE FOURTH AMENDMENT §§ 9.1-9.7 (3d ed. 1996).
253. See William J. Stuntz, Warrants and Fourth Amendment Remedies, 77 VA. L. REV.
881, 897 (1991) ([]n the ordinary case the probable cause standard is likely to be fairly
predictable to those who must apply it.").
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In the criminal procedure context, then, the volume of cases and
the need for advance planning point in favor of wide rather than
narrow rulings. An important part of minimalist theory, however,
is respect for democratic processes. Even if wide rulings are desir-
able, it does not follow that they should come from courts rather
than from legislatures.
Here again, however, the criminal procedure context stands
minimalist theory on its head. American legislatures consistently
have failed to address defects in the criminal process, even when
they rise to crisis-level proportions. For example, when the Miranda
Court invited Congress and the states to experiment with alter-
natives to traditional backroom police interrogation, Congress
responded by adopting Title II, which stubbornly insisted on the
traditional practice. To this day only two American jurisdictions,
Alaska and Minnesota, require taping interrogations.25 In both
instances the state courts, rather than the state legislature, were
the source of reform.
Legislatures across the United States have found billions of
dollars for prisons,255 but the support for indigent defense is
shamefully inadequate.256 No legislature has adopted reforms of
police identification procedures, even though we have known since
the 1930s that mistaken identification is the leading cause of false
convictions.257 Legislatures have not filled the voids created by
254. Stephan v. State, 711 P.2d 1156 (Alaska 1985) (due process clause of state
constitution requires taping interrogation); State v. Scales, 518 N.W.2d 587 (Minn. 1994)
(noting that under court's supervisory power warnings, waiver and interrogation must be
recorded whenever practicable); Peoplev. Owens, 713 N.Y.S.2d 452,453 (N.Y. Sup. Ct. 2000)
("But in the fifteen years since the Stephan decision, the majority ofotherjurisdictions have
declined to adopt a recording requirement"). Texas by statute requires that the suspect's
waiver and statements be recorded, but does not require that the questioning itselfbe taped.
See TEX. CRIM. PROC. CODE ANN. art. 38.22 (Vernon 1999).
255. See, e.g., Christopher M. Alexander, Note, Indeterminate Sentencing:An Analysis of
Sentencing in America, 70 S. CAL. L. REV. 1717, 1740 (1997) ("New prison construction
projects that are under way will cost this nation's taxpayers about $6.8 billion.").
256. See, e.g., DonaldA. Dripps, IneffectiveAssistance of Counsel: The Case for an ExAnte
Parity Standard, 88 J. CRnM. L. & CRIMINOLoGY 242, 245-51 (1997) (reviewing studies); Note,
Gideon's Promise Unfulfilled: The Need for Litigated Reform of Indigent Defense, 113 HARV.
L. REV. 2062, 2063 ("ITihere is broad consensus that criminal defense systems are in'a state
of perpetual crisis.").
257. See EDWINM. BORCHARD, CONVICTINGTHE INNOCENT xiii (1932) ("Perhaps the major
source of these tragic errors is identification of the accused by the victim of a crime of
violence.m"); cf Peter Neufeld, Esq. & Barry C. Scheck, Commentary, in EDWARD CONNORS ET
AL., CONVICTED BY JURIES, EXONERATED BY SCIENCE: CASE STUDIES IN THE USE OF DNA
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contemporary pro-government criminal procedure rulings. They
have not, for instance, adopted statutory regulations of undercover
operations, even though the Court has left such operations un-
regulated by the Fourth Amendment. They have not adopted
statutory requirements for judicial warrants, or the preservation of
exculpatory evidence, or plugged holes in the exclusionary rule, let
alone delivered the effective tort remedy exclusionary rule critics
have advocated for decades.
The record is not an accident, but the product of rational political
incentives."' Almost everyone has an interest in controlling crime.
Only young men, disproportionately black, are at significant risk of
erroneous prosecution for garden-variety felonies. Abuses of police
search and seizure or interrogation powers rarely fall upon middle-
aged, middle-class citizens. When powerful interest groups are sub-
ject to the exercise of police powers that pale in comparison to what
is visited on young black men luckless enough to reside in "a high
crime area," things are different. The current protest against grand
jury investigations is illustrative. But so long as the vast bulk of
police and prosecutorial power targets the relatively powerless (and
when will that ever be otherwise?), criminal procedure rules that
limit public power will come from the courts or they will come from
nowhere.
B. The Problem With Depth
Thus far we have seen that, with criminal procedure in general
and Miranda in particular, width is more likely to be a virtue than
a vice in a criminal procedure ruling. But if width is desirable in
EVIDENCE TO ESTABLISH INNOCENCE AFIER TRIALxxviii, xxx (1996) ("Interestingly, in many
respects the reasons for the conviction of the innocent in the DNA cases do not seem
strikingly different than those cited by... Borchard ...."). Promising reforms are possible. See
Gina Kolata & Iver Peterson, New Jersey Is Trying New Way For Witnesses to Say, 'It's
Him,- N.Y. TIMES, July 21, 2001, at Al (discussing new procedures adopted in New Jersey
requiring sequential photo arrays administered by officers ignorant of suspect's identity). The
New Jersey reforms were adopted by the State's Attorney General, not the legislature, over
considerable opposition from the police.
258. See Donald A. Dripps, Criminal Procedure, Footnote Four, and the Theory of Public
Choice: or, Why Don't Legislatures Give a Damn About the Rights of the Accused?, 44
SYRACUSE L. REV. 1079, 1081 (1993) ("Legislatures undervalue the rights of the accused at
both the investigatory and adjudicatory stages of the criminal process. This is not an
historical accident but a predicable consequence of political incentives that appear to be of
indefinite duration.").
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criminal procedure doctrine, there is a serious problem with the
dimension of depth. In a nutshell, the sort of undertheorized
agreement likely in Supreme Court adjudication tends to under-
mine the legitimacy, and/or compromise the clarity, of bright-line
rules. As a result, over time succeeding majorities are faced with
the dilemma of following a deep justification contemporary justices
do not accept, or compromising a broad rule even though contem-
porary justices agree that a broad rule is highly desirable.
Why are shallow justifications for broad rules in criminal
procedure so problematic? First, the sheer volume of criminal
procedure cases makes undertheorized agreement on particulars of
very limited use. An overlapping consensus on Case 1 is all well and
good. Very soon, however, another case will come along that will
expose the fault lines in a coalition. (Remember those fifteen million
arrests per year). If the Supreme Court resolves this second case,
it will have to realign itself to reflect the competing abstract
theories of the individual justices. If the Supreme Court declines to
decide the second case, the lower courts will have to decide many
such cases, either guessing about what the majority of the current
Court would do, or following their own abstract principles wherever
these may lead. Police in jurisdictions that have not decided Case
2 will have no guidance; both liberty and security may suffer as a
result.
Second, because of legislative abdication, the courts must work
under the aegis of the Constitution. Disagreement about constitu-
tional interpretation is certainly predictable and probably salutary.
Americans have never agreed about constitutional interpretation
and it is not likely that they will anytime soon. Thus the turn to the
courts-especially when federal courts supply the only regular and
substantial regulation of state police who conduct most of the
nation's law enforcement-means a turn to the Constitution and
attending controversy.
Third, even if the Justices agreed on a single basic interpretive
approach, the available doctrinal resources are not very clear. The
institutional framework of modern criminal justice differs so greatly
from that known to the authors of the Bill of Rights that, as
Lawrence Lessig has argued, something akin to translation is
required before the constitutional text is even relevant to modern
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practice. 9 We know, for instance, the text of the Fifth Amendment,
and we know that the self-incrimination privilege was designed to
prevent the use of oaths and torture to extract confessions. What
such a provision requires in the context of police interrogation is
open to reasonable disagreement, given that the text is conclusory
(what exactly is compulsion?) and history nonprescriptive. The
Founders could not foresee professional civil police forces, sys-
tematic psychological interrogation tactics, or the diminished
significance of oaths in a more secular age.
That legal materials such as these can (or should) control public
policy for an indefinite future seems improbable. The translation
metaphor is only that, a metaphor, not a methodology. Chapman's
Homer is not Dryden's; Ciardi's Dante is not Pinsky's. And one is
reminded of the old saw that translations are like lovers-the
desirable ones are unfaithful and the faithful ones are undesirable.
Finally, the peculiar historical context of the criminal procedure
revolution has forced legal doctrine into the mold of the Bill of
Rights. The need for breadth effectively ruled out reliance on the
Due Process Clause, because of the case-by-case approach to due
process analysis adopted inBetts v. Brady.26 ° But the Bill of Rights
criminal procedure provisions are quite specific; they do not speak
to many aspects of the modern process, such as identification
procedures or undercover operations at all. And when they do
speak to modern practice, as with the Fifth Amendment privilege,
they do so with a particularity that requires embarrassing com-
promises of the sort struck by Miranda. The Fourth Amendment is
an exception, but has been one only since the Court rejected the
linkage between the Warrant Clause and the Reasonableness
Clause. At that point the Fourth Amendment became banal (who
could support unreasonable searches?) except for its institutional
implications, i.e., that reasonableness would be determined by the
federal courts, not the corner police officer.
We can perhaps now see a little more clearly why constitutional
criminal procedure seems so full of contradictions and hypocrisy.
There is general agreement on the need for broad rules, but there
is general disagreement about the content of those rules. Historical
circumstances compel courts announcing broad rules to adopt deep
259. Lawrence Lessig, Fidelity in Translation, 71 TEx. L. REV. 1165 (1993).
260. 316 U.S. 455 (1942).
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justifications. Subsequent courts must choose between carrying
forward a rationale they believe to be wrong, or compromising a
rule they know to be necessary.
One could cite almost any decision in a modern criminal
procedure casebook to illustrate this tension, but Dickerson will do
quite nicely. An overlapping consensus agrees not to overrule
Miranda and so coalesces around Chief Justice Rehnquist's artfully
wooden opinion. Some Justices join because they think Miranda's
deep justification is correct; some agree because they know a broad
rule is needed and there is no alternative broad rule that commands
a majority; some agree out of respect for stare decisis, and so on.
The majority, however, does not agree about the impeachment and
fruits cases, because stare decisis points one way and Miranda's
deep justification points another.
So the impeachment and fruits issues go undecided. Police will
continue to have an incentive to keep questioning after suspects
invoke Miranda, because fruits and impeachment material may
turn out to be valuable down the road. The lower courts will have
to decide whether the specific holdings in Harris, Hass, Tucker
and Elstad survive Dickerson's recognition of Miranda as a
"constitutional decision." Legislatures and state courts know no
more now than before about what sort of alternatives might satisfy
Miranda's demand for procedural safeguards.
These are all significant costs of leaving things undecided, but let
me dwell briefly on this last point. State courts in Alaska26 and
Minnesota26 2 have required state police to tape record interro-
gations.263 This is a major safeguard against both disregard of
Miranda and against other forms of coercion."4 In its brief in
Dickerson, the Justice Department argued that law enforcement
261. Stephan v. State, 711 P.2d 1156 (Alaska 1985) (ruling based on state constitution's
due process clause).
262. State v. Scales, 518 N.W.2d 587 (Minn. 1994) (ruling based on court's supervisory
power over administration of criminal justice).
263. Texas provides by statute that statements obtained through custodial interrogation
are admissible only if there is an electronic recording memorializing the administration of
warnings, a voluntary waiver, and the statement, but the statute does not require that the
interrogation yielding the confession be similarly recorded. See TExm CRiM. PRoc. CoDEANN.
art. 88.22 (Vernon 1999).
264. Recording is required by both the MODEL CODE OF PRE-ARRAIGNMENT PROCEDURE §
130.4(3) (American Law Institute 1975) and UNIFORM RULES OF CRIMINAL PROCEDURE §
243(b), 10 U.L.A. 32 (Master ed. Supp. 1992).
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can live with Miranda, but that the additional prophylactic rule of
Edwards v. Arizona,265 barring all further questioning after a
suspect invokes the right to counsel, imposes an unwarranted
burden on legitimate investigation.2"
A strong argument could be made that a jurisdiction requiring
tape recording should be let out from under the Edwards rule. The
theory is that, having gone beyond the Miranda rules in an
important respect, the state has done enough to dispel the inherent
compulsion of custodial interrogation. If the police reapproached the
suspect after a significant time interval, and tape-recorded a new
admonition and valid waiver, the taping safeguard might be
thought sufficient to justify relaxing the Miranda rules with respect
to the consequences of invocation. The obvious incentive effect
would be to encourage the states, and Congress, to move toward
taping. They are unlikely to make that move without some sort of
indication from the Court that there is something in it for the public
interest.267
The Dickerson Court, however, was in no position to make any
such invitation. To do that, it would need to agree on a deep
justification of Miranda, either the original one or a new one. That
agreement was absent. This is not surprising, as I have indicated
above. But it is also costly, because it deprives all the other
actors in the criminal justice process-legislatures, lower courts,
police administrators, prosecutors, and defense counsel-of a stable
understanding of the governing law.
V. THE CONTINUING QUEST FOR BROAD-BUT-SHALLOW
If the argument presented so far is correct, the institutional
context of criminal procedure doctrine-characterized by a high
volume of cases, costly retrials as the dominant remedy, and legis-
lative neglect-calls for relatively broad constitutional rulings.
265. 451 U.S. 477 (1981).
266. Brieffor the United States at 35, Dickersonv. United States, 530 U.S. 428 (2000) (No.
99-5525) ("WhileMiranda itself is generallyworkable, federal law enforcement agencies have
encountered difficulties with some ofthe extensions of Miranda inEdwards v. Arizona ... and
later cases.") (citation omitted).
267. See, e.g., People v. Owens, 713 N.Y.S.2d 452,453 (Sup. Ct. 2000) ("But in the fifteen
years since the Stephan decision, the majority of other jurisdictions have declined to adopt
a recording requirement.").
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When such rulings are supported only by a temporary overlapping
consensus, however, rule of law values such as legitimacy, clarity,
consistency, and neutrality are likely to suffer accordingly.
Commentators who agree on little else voice a common complaint
about the fast-and-loose constitutional interpretation in the
criminal procedure cases.268 Many of the Justices voice the same
complaint from time to time;269 Justice Scalia voiced it again in the
Dickerson dissent. Yet the justices who decide criminal cases are
no different than the justices who decide Separation of Powers
cases or Takings Clause cases or First Amendment cases. The need
for width, qualified by the problem of depth, helps to explain the
268. Akhil Amar has voiced these concerns most vociferously, but even those who reject
his prescriptions sympathize with his diagnosis. See Akhil Reed Amar, The Future of
Constitutional CriminalProcedure, 33 Am. CRlM. L.REv. 1123,1125 (1996) ("Like the Warren
Court, the Burger and Rehnquist Courts have at times paid little heed to constitutional text,
history, and structure and have mouthed rules one day only to ignore them the next."); Carol
Steiker, 'First Principles" of Constitutional Criminal Procedure: A Mistake?, 112 HARV. L.
REv. 680, 682-683 (1999) (book review) (finding "Amar's critique of current doctrine often
compelling"); George C. Thomas III, Remapping the Criminal Procedure Universe, 83 VA. L.
REV. 1819,1819 (1997) (book review) ("[T]he law of criminal procedure had become encrusted
with doctrinal complexities that seemed to bear little or no relationship to the underlying
constitutional rights.").
269. The usual litany of constitutional authority is text, history, and precedent. For
examples of complaints that the Court has disregarded the text, see Maryland v. Craig, 497
U.S. 836, 861 (1990) (Scalia, J., dissenting) (arguing that majority's approval of child
witnesses testifying on closed-circuit-television over confrontation-clause objection amounts
to "subordination of explicit constitutional text to currently favored public policy"); United
States v. Leon, 468 U.S. 897, 960 (1984) (Stevens, J., dissenting) (arguing that majority's
good-faith exception for objectively reasonable reliance on warrants not supported by
probable cause offends constitutional text). For complaints that the Court has disregarded
history, see Griffim v. Wisconsin, 483 U.S. 868, 883 (1987) (Blackmun, J., dissenting)
(suggesting majority's approval of warrantless search of probationer's home defies
constitutional tradition); Johnson v. Louisiana, 406 U.S. 356, 381 (1972) (Douglas, J.,
dissenting) (noting where majority upholds nonunanimous jury verdicts convicting the
defendants: "I dissent from this radical departure from American traditions."). For examples
of complaints that the Court has disregarded precedent, see Kirby v. Illinois, 406 U.S. 682,
705 (1972) (White, J., dissenting) ("United States v. Wade and Gilbert v. California govern
this case and compel reversal of the judgment below.") (citations omitted) (entirety of
dissenting opinion); Harris v. New York, 401 U.S. 222,230 (1971) (Brennan, J., dissenting)
(arguing majority's approval of impeachment with statements obtained in violation of
Miranda disregards precedent, and noting "[we settled this proposition in Miranda").
270. Dickerson, 530 U.S. at 465 (Scalia, J., dissenting) ("In imposing its Court-made code
upon the States, the original opinion at least asserted that it was demanded by the
Constitution. Today's decision does not pretend that it is-and yet still asserts the right to
impose it against the will of the people's representatives in Congress.").
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situation. Criminal procedure doctrine is disappointing because its
institutional context is so challenging. Daunting-nay, depressing-
as it is, this analysis has the ring of truth.
How might judges and scholars go about addressing the
challenge? This Article concludes by considering three possible
approaches. First, the Court might conclude that legitimacy deficits
are intolerable and resort to case-by-case adjudication based solely
on the constitutional text, with no intervening layer ofjudge-made
doctrine. The Dickerson dissent points in this direction. I shall
argue, however, that the case-by-case approach is as impractical as
ever, and is liable to a legitimacy deficit of its own.
Alternatively, the Justices might simply tolerate legitimacy
deficits. The Dickerson opinion rather openly takes this view,
describing the inconsistencies in the case law as "normal." One
might defend this attitude by reference to research on collective-
decision theory, which indicates that decisions by a collective body
cannot guarantee transitive results. I shall argue, however, that
even giving due account to the challenge posed by collective-decision
theory, theDickerson majority's bland acquiescence in inconsistency
deserves professional criticism.
More specifically, the Justices in Dickerson should have under-
taken the common-law process of distinguishing, reconciling, and,
when needed, overruling precedents. One might suppose that this
is the obvious course, but the Dickerson majority simply refused to
grapple with the Miranda case law. If the Court had undertaken
the common-law process, it could have materially advanced rule-of-
law values. There are different strategies for minimizing the
inconsistencies in the cases. In the absence of any lead from the
justices, the lower courts will have to undertake this process,
guessing as best they can about what Miranda's now-secure
constitutional status does to the overall body of Fifth Amendment
law.
But there are limits on what even the slyest lawyers can do by
way of rationalizing cases. Ultimately, the institutional context of
criminal procedure means that the Justices need to find a doctrinal
predicate for broad rulings that can sustain a relatively shallow
justification over time. Without that support, even heroic legalisms
will not fully secure rule-of-law values. With that support, legalisms
would rarely be needed to hold the law together.
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It may be that the institutional context is overwhelming and
palliative legalisms are all that can be hoped for. At least one
doctrinal move, however, deserves consideration. There is wide-
spread agreement on achieving instrumental reliability in the
criminal process. There is no such agreement on the relative
priority of public security and individual autonomy or dignity. A
turn to due process adjudication, freed from the discredited case-by-
case approach, might enable justices who disagree about much to
agree on broad rules designed to prevent miscarriages ofjustice. In
short, we should not despair about criminal procedure until the
Court has given Mathews v. Eldridge"1 a fair trial in criminal
cases.
A One Case at a Time?
Justice Scalia's dissent, which Justice Thomas joined, targets the
majority's recognition of a "constitutional rule" prohibiting some
practices that the Constitution itself permits. In Scalia's view, at
least some statements given by suspects in custody who have not
received Miranda warnings are not compelled within the meaning
of the Fifth Amendment.12 The majority, therefore, usurped the
power to expand constitutional rights.27' As Scalia points out in
a particularly telling salvo, the Court has expressly denied
Congress the power to expand constitutional rights, despite the
textual empowerment of Congress contained in Section Five of the
271. 424 U.S. 319 (1976).
272. Justice Scalia noted in Dickerson:
Moreover, history and precedent aside, the decision in Miranda, if read as an
explication of what the Constitution requires, is preposterous. There is, for
example, simply no basis in reason for concluding that a response to the very
first question asked, by a suspect who already knows all of the rights described
in the Miranda warning, is anything other than a volitional act.
Dickerson, 530 U.S. at 448-49 (Scalia, J., dissenting).
273. Id. at 456 (Scalia, J., dissenting) ("In my view, our continued application of the
Miranda code to the States despite our consistent statements that running afoul of its
dictates does not necessarily-or even usually-result in an actual constitutional violation,
represents not the source of Miranda's salvation but rather evidence of its ultimate
illegitimacy.").
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Fourteenth Amendment.27 In a nutshell, Scalia accuses the major-
ity of judicial legislation.
If the dissent accurately targets the legitimacy deficit attending
the majority opinion, Justice Scalia manifestly failed to make a
strong case for a return to case-by-case adjudication. The dissent
has all the weaknesses of the Miranda dissents, 7" with far less
excuse."' Decades of experience confirm that the police can comply
274. Id. at 460 (Scalia, J., dissenting) ("The powerwith which the Courtwould endow itself
under a 'prophylactic' justification for Miranda goes far beyond what it has permitted
Congress to do under authority of that text.").
275. The obligatory citation is to Yale Kamisar, A Dissent from the Miranda Dissents:
Some Comments on the "New"PifthAmendment and the Old 'Voluntariness" Test, 65 MICH.
L. REv. 59 (1966).
276. Experience has shown that Miranda does far less harm to law enforcement than the
Miranda dissenters feared. Justice Harlan thought that Miranda would "heavily handicap
questioning." Miranda v. Arizona, 384 U.S. 436, 517 (1966) (Harlan, J., dissenting). Justice
White thought interrogation less coercive, and suspects more cunning, than appears to be
the case, for he thought that the majority"not only prevents the use of compelled confessions
but for all practical purposes forbids interrogation except in the presence of counsel." Id. at
536 (White, J., dissenting). Current research, however, indicates that 80% of suspects waive
rather than invoke Miranda rights. See Paul Cassell & Bret Hayman, Police Interrogation
in the 1990s: An Empirical Study of the Effects of Miranda, 43 UCLAL. REv. 839,858 (1996);
Richard Leo, Inside the Interrogation Room, 86 J. CRIM. L. & CRIMINOLOGY 266,286 (1996).
The 80% figure does not include noncustodial interviews in which the police need not
administer the warnings, and the suspects who invoke their Miranda rights would be the
suspects least likely to confess under questioning that complies with the due process test.
Experience thus seems to lessen the strength of the Miranda dissents. See Brief for the
United States at 32, Dickerson v. United States, 530 U.S. 428 (2000) (No. 99-5525) ("In our
view, however, the cost of Miranda's exclusionary rule does not so impede or undermine law
enforcement that the overruling of Miranda is warranted. Rather, the judgment and
experience of federal law enforcement agencies is that Miranda is workable in practice and
serves several significant law enforcement objectives.").
There is extensive and contentious empirical research literature on Miranda's
consequences. See id. at 32 n.23 (citing studies). Even Paul Cassell, however, estimates
Miranda's social cost as the loss of convictions in 3.8% of all arrests. See Paul Cassell &
Richard Fowles, Handcuffing the Cops? A Thirty-Year Perspective on Miranda's Harmful
Effects on Law Enforcement, 50 STAN. L. REV. 1055, 1061 (1998). This estimate is based on
the assumptions that Miranda caused a 16% drop in the number of cases in which the
suspect confesses, and that a confession is necessary to obtain a conviction in 24% of these
cases. This in turn assumes, among other things, that (1) all persons who refuse to make an
incriminating statement because ofMiranda are, in fact, guilty;, (2) that Miranda causes the
loss of confessions randomly, i.e., that the police do not work more successfully to obtain
waivers and statements in cases in which these appear to be necessary, or work harder to
obtain evidence other than a confession when it is known that the suspect has invoked
Miranda; (3) that the confession rate can be estimated consistently by different researchers
at different times; and (4) that the police and suspects would return to 1965 behavior
patterns if Miranda were overruled. In my view each of these assumptions is false; but the
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with Miranda at acceptable cost. Given the volume of criminal
cases, a return to the totality-of-the-circumstances approach
would underenforce constitutional rights, deprive police and lower
courts of needed guidance, generate extensive collateral litigation,
foster inconsistent results, and require overruling precedent on a
sweeping scale. Dewey-eyed academics are not the only people
moved by the force of these concerns. They were sufficient to
persuade both Chief Justice Rehnquist, who wrote the majority
opinion, and Attorney General Reno, who signed off on the govern-
ment brief, to reject a return to the case-by-case approach.
Justice Scalia seems blissfully unaware of the actual practice of
police interrogation. The idea that people who will be shot if they
try to leave are having a voluntary conversation with their captors
is not intuitively obvious. And the more information that is added
to the picture-how the police are trained to exploit guilt, fear, and
ignorance by browbeating, lying about the facts of the case, and
pretending sympathy-the less voluntary custodial interrogation
looks. 7 Chief Justice Burger, for one, argued that police inter-
rogation was more coercive than grand jury interrogation of a
witness subject to the contempt sanction.
On May 19, 1958, the Supreme Court decided two confessions
cases under the voluntariness standard. In the first case, Thomas
v. Arizona,279 the defendant, who was black, was lassoed by a
member of a posse, and apparently threatened with lynching before
3.8% estimate, inflated as it is, is not the sort of cataclysm that Miranda's contemporary
critics feared.
277. See, eg., Bernard Weisberg, Police Interrogation of Arrested Persons: A Skeptical
View, 52 J. CRIM. L. & CRtPMNOLOGY 21 (1961). The most obvious evidence that custodial
interrogation is inherently coercive is the fact that the great majority of suspects waive their
rights. Justice Scalia tries to distinguish "foolish" from "compelled" confessions. See
Dickerson, 530 U.S. at 449 ("There is a world ofdifference, which the Court recognized under
the traditional voluntariness test but ignored in Miranda, between compelling a suspect to
incriminate himself and preventing him from foolishly doing so ofhis own accord."). I can
believe that those suspected of crime are typically not rocket scientists, but I can't believe
that eighty percent of them are complete fools. They waive their rights not because they are
foolish but because the skillful exploitation of the custodial environment is indeed coercive.
278. SeeUnitedStatesv. Mandujano, 425 U.S. 564,579 (1976) ([T~he compulsionto speak
in the isolated setting of the police station may well be greater than in courts or other official
investigations, where there are often impartial observers to guard against intimidation or
trickery.") (quoting Miranda v. Arizona, 384 U.S. 436, 461 (1966)) (alteration original in
Mandujano).
279. 356 U.S. 390 (1958).
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the sheriff intervened. The state trial court admitted a confession
given twenty hours after the roping incident, but excluded two
others, given both before and after the admissible statement, as
"procured by threat of lynch."28 A police officer testified that the
sheriff had threatened to permit a lynching unless the defendant
promised to confess, but the other witnesses denied that the sheriff
had acted except as the suspect's protector.28' Over four dissenting
votes the Court found the confession voluntary.
The second case, Payne v. Arkansas,8 2 also involved the threat of
lynching. The sheriff admitted telling the suspect, who was black,
that thirty or forty people wanted to get the suspect, but that
the sheriff could keep them away if the suspect confessed. 83 Over
two dissenting votes the Court found the resulting confession
involuntary.
How many hours, one wonders, does it take for the coercive effect
of near-lynching to dissipate, making the confession merely "foolish"
rather than "compelled"? How effective was the totality-of-the-cir-
cumstances approach at deterring police misconduct, given that in
both of these cases the police exploited threatened lynching to
extract confessions? How many such cases went in favor of the
state based on dubious police testimony about secret, backroom
questioning? And how many times did the police, not knowing
whether the next level of pressure would be ruled legal or illegal,
chose to go over the edge because there was no percentage in
restraint?
In Davis v. North Carolina,' decided under the voluntariness
test two weeks after the Court handed down Miranda, the Court
held involuntary a confession made after sixteen days of detention
incommunicado, during which the suspect was questioned inter-
mittently. The Supreme Court, it is true, reversed, but it is worth
noting how the voluntariness test worked outside the Supreme
Court at that late date. The police did not feel the need to bring
their prisoner before a court, or to enable representation by counsel,
for more than two weeks. The trial judge admitted the confession,
280. Id. at 400.
281. Id. at 402.
282. 356 U.S. 560 (1958).
283. Id. at 565.
284. 384 U.S. 737 (1966).
285. Id. at 738.
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the state supreme court affirmed the trial court, and the lower
federal courts denied the petition for a writ of habeas corpus. Two
Justices of the Supreme Court (Clark and Harlan) would have held
the confession voluntary.
Imagine trying to apply the voluntariness test today in tens of
thousands of confessions cases. Police would always have an
incentive to increase the pressure on a suspect, because even
extreme methods would not render a confession inadmissible per se.
On the other hand the police could never know for sure that their
methods would survive judicial scrutiny. What would qualify as
coerced in front of one judge could very well qualify as voluntary in
front of another.
Case-by-case inquiry, pitting the defendant's testimony about the
secret proceedings against that of the police, did very little to
prevent compulsion as a practical matter. The turn to bright-line
rules came only after numerous failed efforts to enforce the
voluntariness requirement. This being the case, there is no clear
legitimacy advantage to the case-by-case approach. If Miranda
bars the introduction of at least some statements that were not
compelled, the voluntariness approach would permit the intro-
duction of at least some statements that were compelled.
Miranda did nothing more than interpret the self-incrimination
privilege in light of the practice of police interrogation, a practice
the framers could not have foreseen. If, as Professor Lessig argues,
interpretation under these circumstances requires something akin
to translation,286 the translation in this case does not seem strained
at all. As Professor Saltzburg has written:
The honest question that is never addressed by the Miranda
dissenters is the following one: If the drafters of the fifth
amendment's privilege against self-incrimination intended that,
as long as the possibility of incrimination in a criminal case
exists, no magistrate, judge or court of the United States could
compel a person to answer questions-even though the person is
given a lawyer, the proceedings are public and recorded and
scrupulously fair-could they possibly have intended to permit
other officials (police and prosecutors) to compel the same
answers in secret sessions, most often unrecorded, without the
suspect having counsel, and with no judicial protection against
286. See Lessig, supra note 259, at 1165.
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the nature and manner of questioning? Such an honest question
deserves an honest answer; the answer is Miranda."s
Professor Lessig quite convincingly cites Miranda as an example of
"fidelity in translation."
28
From the perspective of legitimacy Justice Scalia's position has
the further difficulty of requiring the overruling of a baker's dozen
of the Court's prior cases. 9 Both Justice Scalia and Justice Thomas
are in somewhat awkward positions respecting precedent. Justice
Scalia would not reopen the incorporation question,290 but Malloy
v. Hogan"1 is only two years older than Miranda and far more
obscure in both the public and the professional consciousness.
Justice Thomas could not bring himself to part from precedent in
the forfeiture cases, even when the facts might well have come out
of Kafka. 92 No doubt the incorporation doctrine's utility in
advancing the cause of religious liberty, and the forfeiture doctrine's
utility in combating the drug trade are simply happy coincidences.
The considerations motivating the Miranda Court's turn to
bright-line rules apply to criminal procedure issues generally. The
volume of cases, the need to guide police and lower courts, and the
absence of constructive legislative intervention are the norm, not
287. Stephen A. Saltzburg, Miranda v. Arizona Revisited: ConstitutionalLaw or Judicial
Fiat, 26 WASHBURN L.J. 1, 14 (1986).
288. Lessig, supra note 259, at 1233-36.
289. In a dozen cases the Supreme Court has required the suppression of evidence or
reversed a conviction on the exclusive basis of the Miranda doctrine. See Thompson v.
Keohane, 516 U.S. 99 (1995); Withrow v. Williams, 507 U.S. 680 (1993); Minnick v.
Mississippi, 498 U.S. 146 (1990); Pennsylvania v. Muniz, 496 U.S. 582 (1990); Arizona v.
Roberson, 486 U.S. 675 (1988); Smith v. Illinois, 469 U.S. 91 (1984); Edwards v. Arizona, 451
U.S. 477 (1981); Tague v. Louisiana, 444 U.S. 469 (1980); Orozco v. Texas, 394 U.S. 324
(1969); Miranda v. Arizona, 384 U.S. 436 (1966); California v. Stewart, 400 P.2d 97 (Cal.
1965), affd sub nom. Miranda v. Arizona, 384 U.S. 436,497-99 (1966); People v. Vignera, 207
N.E. 2d 527 (N.Y. 1965), rev'd sub nom. Miranda v. Arizona, 384 U.S. 436, 493-94 (1996).
Given current Sixth Amendment law, overruling Miranda would also have required
overruling Escobedo v. Illinois, 378 U.S. 478 (1964).
290. See TXO Prod. Corp. v. Alliance Res. Corp., 509 U.S. 443, 470 (1993) (Scalia, J.,
concurring) (approving "the proposition that the Due Process Clause of the Fourteenth
Amendment, despite its textual limitation to procedure, incorporates certain substantive
guarantees specified in the Bill of Rights").
291. 378 U.S. 1 (1964).
292. See Bennis v. Michigan, 516 U.S. 442, 453-55 (1996) (Thomas, J., concurring)
(agreeing that precedent justified forfeiture ofwife's interest in automobile in which husband
employed prostitute notwithstanding apparent unfairness of result).
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the exception, in the criminal procedure context. If these consid-
erations exclude case-by-case approaches in favor of wide rulings,
we must find ways to cope with the problems posed by deep
justifications over time. In the next two sections, I consider two
possible approaches: scrupulous stare decisis in criminal procedure
cases, and a turn to reliability-based norms as the source of
criminal procedure doctrine.
B. Common-Law Process, Constitutional Law Output?
If the argument so far presented is correct, broad rulings in
criminal procedure cases are highly desirable but problematic with
respect to justification. Because justifications for wide consti-
tutional rulings tend to run deep, broad rules are difficult to sustain
over time. Miranda is a good example. The prophylactic-rules cases
rejected Miranda's deep justification in factually distinct cases.
This, in turn, left Miranda itself eligible for overruling, but in the
state Miranda cases, different majorities proceeded in accordance
withMiranda's original justification. Now the Court has reaffirmed
Miranda without explicitly questioning the prophylactic-rules
cases.
Dickerson makes no attempt to distinguish or repudiate Tucker.
The Chief Justice wrote both Tucker and Dickerson.293 Dickerson
purports to distinguish Elstad but the attempt is patently un-
convincing.2 ' Justice Stevens dissented in Elstad but joined the
majority inDickerson.95 Legal minds as formidable as these cannot
possibly subscribe to the Dickerson opinion's feeble attempt to
distinguish Elstad. Almost as if in a famous scene from The Wizard
of Oz, we are solemnly enjoined to "pay no attention to those cases
behind the curtain!"
293. In Tucker Justice Rehnquist wrote that "the police conduct at issue here did not
abridge respondents constitutional privilege against compulsory self-incrimination, but
departed only from the prophylactic standards later laid down by this Court in Miranda to
safeguard that privilege." Michigan v. Tucker, 417 U.S. 433, 446 (1974). In Dickerson he
wrote that Miranda "being a constitutional decision of this Court, may not be in effect
overruled by an Act of Congress," Dickerson v. United States, 530 U.S. 428,428 (2000), "that
Miranda is a constitutional decision," id. at 438, that "Miranda is of constitutional origin,"
id. at 439 n.3, that "Miranda is constitutionally based," id. at 440, and that "Miranda
announced a constitutional rule that Congress may not supersede legislatively," id. at 444.
294. See supra notes 215-19 and accompanying text.
295. Oregon v. Elstad, 470 U.S. 298, 364 (1985) (Stevens, J., dissenting).
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True, the precise issue before the Court was whether government
agents are constitutionally obliged to give the warnings, not the
scope of the exclusionary remedy. The steady flow of criminal
cases, however, means that there is no easy way to avoid decision.
For example, the district court resolved a fruits issue against
Dickerson.29 Simultaneous with the decision in Dickerson, the
Court denied certiorari in a circuit court case denying qualified
im-unity to police who question suspects invoking their Miranda
rights, a practice that apparently had become common due to the
admissibility of derivative evidence and of tainted statements to
impeach.9 ' Now the lower courts must grapple with these issues in
light of a Miranda opinion that secured the agreement of both
Rehnquist and Stevens, who have hitherto expressed incompatible
views.
The Court's opinion might have taken a more scrupulous attitude
toward stare decisis, either by articulating some genuine dis-
tinctions between the impeachment or fruits cases and Miranda, or
by expressly disapproving prior decisions that cannot be reconciled
with Miranda's reaffimed constitutional stature. There are
plausible arguments for reconciling the prophylactic-rules cases
with the state Miranda cases. As Professor Weisselberg points out,
in Harris, Tucker, and Elstad, the police violated Miranda in good
faith.29 The impeachment exception might be justified on other
theories, such as the idea that the accused who takes the stand
waives the privilege against self-incrimination. 99 Likewise, the
fruits cases might be reconciled with Kastigar by focusing on the
comparative haste and uncertainty of police investigations relative
to grand jury investigations, and the corresponding difficulty of
proving independent source or inevitable discovery in the Miranda
context."° Alternatively, the Dickerson opinion could have directly
repudiated the prophylactic-rules cases.
Instead, the Court clings obstinately to two lines of cases that
were inconsistent enough to require granting certiorari in
Dickerson in the first place. The decisions of a collective body are
296. See supra notes 220-22 and accompanying text.
297. CaliforniaAttorneys for Criminal Justice v. Butts, 195 F.3d 1039 (9th Cir. 1999), cert.
denied, 530 U.S. 1261 (2000).
298. Weisselberg, supra note 10, at 153-62.
299. Dripps, supra note 223, at 27-34.
300. Id. at 38-40.
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liable to inconsistency in a way that individual decisions are not.
Collective-decision theory's impossibility theorem teaches that
no un-rigged collective decision process can secure completely
transitive results."0 1 Thus there will be at least some occasions
when a committee in a sequence of cases prefers outcome A to
outcome B, outcome B to outcome C, and outcome C to outcome A.
Social choice theory does not, however, prove that intransitive
collective preferences need be common, practically important,
or unexplained by individual members of the committee. Indeed,
with respect to both courts and legislatures, the most interesting
question would appear to be why, given Arrow's Theorem, repub-
lican institutions do not produce manifestly incoherent decisions
more often than they do.
With respect to courts, Professor Steam has argued that legal
conventions such as standing and stare decisis operate to reduce
the predicted intransitivity of collective decisions." 2 It may turn out
that institutional criticism of the Court as a body is justifiable, but
that issue can be left unresolved for purposes of my present
argument. Even if collective decision theory supplied an excuse for
the Court as a body, it cannot immunize individual justices from
the charge of inconsistency. The argument that follows suggests
individual justices should adopt a more rigorous approach to stare
decisis in criminal procedure cases. Such an approach would
minimize both the frequency, and the consequences, of the sort of
unjustified distinctions drawn in the Miranda cases.303
301. For accessible discussions of Arrow's Theorem, see DANIEL A. FARBER & PHILIP P.
FRicnY, LAw AND PUBLIc CHOICE 3842 (1991); Herbert Hovenkamp, Arrow's Theorem:
Ordinalism andRepublican Government, 75 IOWAL. REV. 949 (1990). Both discussions focus
on the application ofthe theorem to legislatures. The seminal contribution on the application
of Arrow's Theorem to the Supreme Court is Frank H. Easterbrook, Ways of Criticizing the
Court, 95 HARv. L. REv. 802 (1982).
302. See Maxwell L. Stearns, Standing Back from the Forest: Justiciability and Social
Choice, 83 CAL. L. REV. 1309 (1995); Maxwell L. Stearns, Standing and Social Choice:
Historical Evidence, 144 U. PA. L. REV. 309 (1995).
303. There is an interesting debate in the social choice literature about the relative merits
of issue voting and outcome voting. Appellate courts in the United States rely on outcome
voting, that is to say, rather than take separate votes on each issue necessary for decision,
the judges take a single vote on whether to affirm or reverse. The downside to outcome
voting is that decisions need not resolve the issues clearly or consistently; the downside to
issue voting is that defining the issues and selecting the order in which they are considered
could have dramatic and arbitrary influences on the development of the law. Scrupulous
stare decisis takes a middle course between issue and outcome voting. Outcome voting is
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Typically a majority that agrees on a decision inconsistent with
a prior decision will be composed of two factions. The first faction
includes the dissenters from the prior decision, who continue to
believe the first decision mistaken. Although in the minority in
Case 1, the former dissenters are now reinforced by the vote or
votes of those who believe that Case 2 is actually distinguishable
from Case 1. If Case 1 was decided by a narrow majority, it can well
be that in Case 2, seven or eight justices agree that Cases 1 and
2 should reach the same result, but the Court concludes that the
two cases are distinguishable. Let us label the two factions the
"idiosyncratic center" and "the unrepentant dissenters."
In Dickerson, for practical reasons, a majority did not want to
return to case-by-case adjudication. Nonetheless, at least the Chief
Justice presumably still disagrees with Miranda's original justifi-
cation. If at least two other justices in the Dickerson majority (as
sheer speculation, say O'Connor and Kennedy) reject Miranda's
original justification but refuse to overrule Miranda itself because
of stare decisis, no more than fourjustices would support Miranda's
original justification.
The situation is likely to get even messier because Justice Scalia
announced in dissent that he will continue to vote his conscience in
future Miranda cases.'0 4 If Justice Thomas, who joined Scalia's
dissent,0 5 follows suit, there will be two votes for the government
in every Miranda case. One supposes that they will often enjoy the
support of the Chief Justice, whose majority opinion labors so hard
to avoid repudiating the prophylactic-rules cases. Only two more
justices would be needed to rule in favor of admitting a disputed
statement. We may thus see cases in which distinct majorities of
the justices agree that the suspect was in custody, that the suspect
retained, but resolutions of particular issues in prior cases are deemed controlling. This
minimizes the incoherence risked by outcome voting, without risking the manipulation ofthe
agenda that issue voting might invite. On issue voting and outcome voting, see Lewis A.
Kornhauser & Lawrence G. Sager, Unpacking the Court, 96 YALE L.J. 82 (1986); David Post
& Steven C. Salop, RowingAgainst the Tidewater:A Theory of Voting by Multijudge Panels,
80 GEo. L.J. 743 (1992); John M. Rogers, "I Vote This Way Because I'm Wrong": The Supreme
Court Justice as Epimenides, 79 KY. L. REV. 439 (1991); Colloquium,Appellate Court Voting
Rules, 49 VAND. L.J. 993 (1996).
304. Dickersonv. United States, 530 U.S. 428,465 (2000) (Scalia, J., dissenting) ("I dissent
from today's decision, and, until § 3501 is repealed, will continue to apply it in all cases
where there has been a sustainable finding that the defendant's confession was voluntary.").
305. See id. at 444.
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was interrogated, that the suspect did not make a valid waiver, that
Miranda remains good law and that the confession is nonetheless
admissible.
Given the need for broad rulings in criminal procedure cases, it
is especially important for justices to accept the justification of
precedents with which they disagree. There is no way to prevent
one or two justices from sincerely, but implausibly, seeing a dis-
tinction between similar cases. Scrupulous stare decisis, however,
could avoid writing idiosyncratic distinctions into actual law.
Unrepentant dissenters should confine themselves to critique, and
wait for the day their views persuade a majority. Justice Harlan's
opinion in Orozco v. Texas 3o. takes the correct approach; his vote to
join the majority in Harris does not.A"
Consider, in this context, the fruits and impeachment cases.
Surely not every justice in the majorities in Harris, Tucker, Hass,
andElstad believed that those decisions were really consistent with
Miranda. While it may never be proven, it is likely that at least
some of the justices in those majorities understood their votes as
laying the groundwork for an eventual overruling ofMiranda.0 8 As
a result, we now deal with major inconsistencies between the
Miranda cases and the formal-compulsion Fifth Amendment cases,
a tension that went far enough to persuade one Court of Appeals
that Miranda itself was no longer good law. °9 If Chief Justice
Burger, and Justices Rehnquist, Blackmun, White, Stewart and
Harlan had followed Miranda's doctrinal logic, they would have
prevented the inconsistent development of the case law in the first
place. A great deal of the criticism of the existing law therefore
falls to prior votes by Justices accepting the prophylactic-rules
characterization.
The obligation of individual Justices to follow precedents with
which they disagree is supported by constitutional principle as
well as by criminal justice pragmatism. A powerful argument can
306. 394 U.S. 324 (1969).
307. See supra notes 151-64 and accompanying text.
308. Justice Brennan, who dissented from the prophylactic rules cases (Tucker excepted,
where he concurred in the result on a retroactivity theory), suspected as much. See Michigan
v. Mosley, 423 U.S. 96,112 (1975) (Brennan, J., dissenting) ("Today's distortion of Miranda's
constitutional principals can be viewed only as yet another step in the erosion and, I suppose,
ultimate overruling of Miranda's enforcement of the privilege against self-incrimination.").
309. United States v. Dickerson, 166 F.3d 667 (4th Cir. 1999).
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be made that individual justices who continue to vote on the
premise that prior decisions were wrong are engaging in civil
disobedience rather than adjudication. The atypical institutional
challenges in the criminal cases gives this jurisprudential claim a
special pragmatic urgency, but it is a strong claim in its own right.
In its dealings with officials of the state governments and of the
other branches of the national government, the Supreme Court
maintains that the Court's decisions are the supreme law of the
land. The claim that a single official, sincerely disagreeing with the
Court's interpretation, may disregard that interpretation in favor
of his own, was precisely the claim Governor Faubus made in
Cooper v. Aaron.1 ° The Court rejected that claim unanimously, and
has not since called Cooper into question.31 The Dickerson majority
rejected the claim that the Congress, a coordinate branch of the
federal government, might disregard the Court's interpretation of
the Constitution.312 Indeed, the Court has rejected that claim even
when Congress acts pursuant to its textually-granted power under
Section Five of the Fourteenth Amendment. 1 '
The broad principle announced in Cooper is, of course, intensely
controversial. 14 A strong tradition in both political history and
contemporary scholarship defends the right of presidents and
legislators to act on their independent interpretations of the
Constitution, even when their interpretations conflict with estab-
lished Supreme Court precedent.1 5 On the other hand, the practical
need for some final authority on constitutional interpretation, and
the institutional advantages of the judiciary in playing that role,
support the expansive position taken by the Court in Cooper.16
310. 358 U.S. 1 (1958).
311. See United States v. Nixon, 418 U.S. 683, 704 (1974) (noting that the Court is
"ultimate interpreter of the Constitution") (quoting Baker v. Carr, 369 U.S. 186,211); Powell
v. McCormick, 395 U.S. 486, 549 (1969) (stating it is "the responsibility of this Court to act
as the ultimate interpreter of the Constitution").
312. Dickerson v. United States, 530 U.S. 428, 437 (2000) (noting "Congress may not
legislatively supersede our decisions interpreting and applying the Constitution").
313. See City of Boerne v. Flores, 521 U.S. 507, 517-21 (1997).
314. See, e.g., Daniel A. Farber, The Supreme Court and the Rule of Law: Cooper v. Aaron
Revisited, 1982 U. ILL. L. REV. 387, 388-89 (1982) (reviewing criticism of Cooper).
315. For an exhaustive defense of coordinate review, see Michael Stokes Paulsen, The
Most Dangerous Branch: Executive Power to Say What the Law Is, 83 GEO. L.J. 217 (1994).
316. See Larry Alexander & Frederick Schauer, On Extrajudicial Constitutional
Interpretation, 110 HARV. L. REV. 1359 (1997) (offering an unqualified defense of Cooper and
its assertion ofjudicial supremacy).
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In any given case, the Supreme Court may be wrong (legally
and/or morally) and the other official right (again legally and/or
morally). As Professors Schauer and Alexander point out, if the law
is to fulfill the settlement ftmction, there must be a decision rule
to govern such conflicts. 17 The location of interpretive finality
can be guided only by institutional predictors of right decisions.
This side of heaven, these predictors will sometimes assign inter-
pretive finality to an institution entertaining a mistaken view.
Realistically, the decision rule can only minimize, not eliminate,
constitutional mistakes.
The argument for the content-independent authority of Supreme
Court precedents vis-a-vis individual justices is stronger than the
argument for judicial supremacy generally. In the first place,
individual justices agreeing with the Cooper principle cannot reject
the authority of precedents without unreasonable inconsistency.
Whatever the theory on which the doctrine of judicial supremacy
rests, no justice can consistently maintain judicial supremacy while
regarding herself as unobligated by decisions of the Court."i'
This is not to say that civil disobedience is never justified. Von
Stauffenberg was a hero, not a wrongdoer. Justice Brennan signed
the opinion in Cooper, but he might have concluded that other
obligations had priority over his obligation to treat Gregg as the
law. 19 Judicial civil disobedience, however, is especially difficult to
317. Id. at 1377 (noting'[wihen the Constitution is subject to multiple interpretations, a
preconstitutional norm must referee among interpretations to decide what is to be done").
318. See Suzanna Sherry, Justice O'Connor's Dilemma: The Baseline Question, 39 WM. &
MARY L. REV. 865,892 (1998):
Although the Court has never squarely faced the question of whether its own
decisions should be taken as a baseline by dissenting members, it has
frequently reiterated the broader view that its decisions are the binding law of
the land. Usually it does so in the course of chastising some rebellious state or
federal official-or some recalcitrant lower federal court-for ignoring the
Court's pronouncements. The language that the Court has used in this context
tends to confirm the unitary nature of the Supreme Court, brushing off the
views of individual Justices as largely irrelevant.
319. See WilliamJ. Brennan, Jr.,InDefense ofDissents, 37 HASTINGSL.J. 427,437 (1986):
This kind of dissent, in which a judge persists in articulating a minority view
of the law in case after case presenting the same issue, seeks to do more than
simply offer an alternative analysis-that could be done in a single dissent and
does not require repetition. Rather, this type of dissent constitutes a statement
by the judge as an individual: "Here I draw the line." Of course, as a member
of a court, one's general duty is to acquiesce in the rulings of that court and to
take up the battle behind the court's new barricades. But it would be a great
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defend. Judges, unlike ordinary citizens, swear an oath to uphold
the law. Unlike ordinary citizens, they claim the obedience of others
to their decisions on the basis of a general obligation to obey the
law. They have the options ofrecusal, resignation, and concurrence-
with-critique. One wonders how Justice Brennan would have dealt
with lower court judges who subverted the Court's rulings in
Miranda or Roe v. Wade by saying, "Here I draw the line."
Alternatively, a justice might reject Cooper and agree that all
officials in all branches owe allegiance to the Constitution as each
interprets it. Justice Scalia may well take this very view, 20 in
which case his promised defiance of Miranda and Dickerson would
not be a manifest inconsistency. My claim here, however, is that
whatever the merits of the larger debate over Cooper, individual
justices in criminal procedure cases ought to follow in good faith
precedents they believe mistaken. This narrow claim draws its
strength from the heightened importance of the settlement function
with respect to judges, and the special importance of the settlement
function in criminal procedure cases.
Consider, first, the difference between individual Article III
judges, including Supreme Court Justices, and other public officials.
Presidents and members of Congress have their own constitutional
responsibilities, which sometimes call for constitutional interpre-
tation. The case for coordinate review is strongest when officials in
the political branches find it necessary to interpret the Constitution
mistake to confuse this unquestioned duty to obey and respect the law with an
imagined obligation to subsume entirely one's own views of constitutional
imperatives to the views of the majority.
Justice Brennan certainly did not claim any moral advantage over lower court judges; he
began his lecture In Defense of Dissents with fulsome praise of Mathew Tobriner. Nor do I
readily imagine that great egalitarian claiming a moral advantage over a humble citizen
called for jury duty in a capital case. What seems unjustified in Justice Brennan's
explanation is the equation of a right to express a different view and a right to have thatview
alter the legal rights and liabilities of parties in litigation. Ajudge is of course free to follow
precedent but file a concurring opinion criticizing that precedent. Justice Harlan did just that
with respect to Miranda in Orozco. In a nutshell, Justice Brennan seems to be equating the
unquestioned right of every person to express political dissent with the dubious right of an
outvoted judge to influence the outcome of a lawsuit contrary to the governing law.
Interestingly, the most plausible defense ofthe Brennan and Marshall death-penalty dissents
takes the view that these dissenting votes actually followed the logic of Gregg, their
expressed abolitionist justifications notwithstanding. See Jordan Steiker, The LongRoad Up
From Barbarism: Thurgood Marshall and the Death Penalty, 71 TEX. L. REV. 1131 (1993).
320. Cf Webster v. Doe, 486 U.S. 592, 608 (1988) (Scalia, J., dissenting) ("[Tihere are
many governmental decisions that are not at all subject to judicial review.").
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in the exercise of their own constitutional duties. Thus a legislator
is thought free to vote against a bill she regards as unconsti-
tutional, even though Supreme Court precedent holds that such a
bill is constitutional. A president is thought to have a right to veto
a bill under similar circumstances.
A plausible rejoinder might be made: voting against legislation
that would promote the general welfare because of reservations
about formal legality, which the courts have rejected, is both
practically unheard of and gratuitously costly. 21 However that
argument might be resolved, judges play a different role than the
President and members of Congress. Judges act on the basis of
debatable constitutional interpretations all the time. Indeed, unlike
other officials, they do very little except make debatable legal
interpretations. A Supreme Court Justice who views Cooper as
inapplicable to herself logically takes the same view regarding
lower court judges. How can a justice ask an appellate or district
court judge to violate a solemn oath to uphold the Constitution?
Suppose a justice is sitting by designation on a circuit court
panel. The case is governed by a Supreme Court decision from
which this justice dissented. Is the justice free to disregard the
precedent? If yes, are not her colleagues on the circuit court panel
equally entitled to do so? If not, why is the justice obliged to follow
precedent on circuit but not on the Supreme Court?
The settlement function of law is generally thought to require
adherence to precedent by lower court judges. Interpretive auton-
omy could not be regulated by the threat of reversal. Trial judges
can bend factual findings to reach the results each thinks consti-
tutionally required in ways that are immune to appellate scrutiny.
Appellate judges know the limits on the Supreme Court's docket
very well. Interpretive anarchy in the judiciary would lead to
something approaching genuine anarchy. Not only would similar
cases be resolved differently, forum-shopping would become imper-
ative, and uncertainty would make reliance problematic. Many of
321. As a representative in Congress, James Madison argued that Congress had no
constitutional power to charter a national bank. His view was later rejected by the Supreme
Court. When, as President, he had to decide whether to veto a bill reauthorizing the bank,
which experience in his view had proved to be in the public interest, he deferred to prevailing
constitutional opinion and signed the bill. See DREw R. McCoy, THE LAST OF THE FATHERS:
JAMES MADISON AND THE REPUBLICAN LEGACY 81 (1989).
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the constitutional interpretations that would flourish would be
quite wrong as well.
Whatever the merits of the case for judicial supremacy generally,
the case of an individual justice is closer to that of a lower court
judge than it is to that of the president or a senator. Moreover, the
settlement function of law is magnified by the institutional context
of criminal procedure. If my analysis of the institutional context of
criminal procedure is correct, individual justices should follow
precedent even ifprecedent is indeed erroneous. Better a second-best
rule consistently applied than a second-best rule erratically applied.
This account of scrupulous stare decisis is not in service to any
particular ideological cause. The individual Justices who refused to
follow Gregg v. Georgia322 may well be right that the death penalty
is immoral. They were certainly within their rights to criticize
Gregg in the hope that a majority of their colleagues would one day
hold capital punishment unconstitutional per se. But they were no
more authorized by law to dissent from the imposition of the death
penalty in a case free from error under Gregg and its progeny than
a condemned prisoner was authorized bylaw to escape. Imagine the
reception the convict would receive when he cites the opinions of
Brennan, Marshall and Blackmun as authority for a jailbreak.
Perhaps capital punishment is a special case, unique in its moral
gravity. If this is so, however, the correct approach for a justice
unwilling to have blood on her hands is to recuse herself from
capital cases. Let justices capable of following the law decide the
case.3 23 That, at least, seems to have been the Court's message to
322. 428 U.S. 153 (1976).
323. The proposition that precedents count as law is of course a conclusion, not a
justification. A necessary, if not sufficient, condition of that status is that they must, like
statutes and the Constitution itself, be accepted widely as authoritative. See Kent
Greenawalt, The Rule of Recognition and the Constitution, 85 MIcH. L. REv. 621,630 (1987)
("In sum, one cannot imagine any normative theory of law [normative in the sense that the
theory opposes conventionalist theories of law] in which the law of a particular society could
be identified wholly independently of socially accepted practices."). The observation that
constitutional law consists mostly of Supreme Court cases, however, has become a
commonplace. See, e.g., Farber, supra note 314 (noting that acceptance of Brown and Cooper
by manywho disagreed with those decisions indicates that constitutional precedents are law,
although where precedent fits in hierarchy of constitutional law is debatable); Henry Paul
Monaghan, Stare Decisis and Constitutional Adjudication, 88 COLUM. L. REv. 723 (1988)
(noting the fact that much constitutional doctrine is at odds with original understanding
proves the precedent is source ofconstitutional law that may trump original understanding);
Edward Rubin, Politics, Doctrinal Coherence, and the Art of Treatise Writing, 21 SEATrLE U.
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those judges on the lower federal courts who blocked executions on
less than compelling legal grounds. 2 It is also the message the
Court consistently has sent to mere citizens called for jury dutywho
honestly express implacable moral opposition to a penalty the Court
has found constitutional. 25
The death penalty example is a telling one, because just as in the
Miranda context, the unrepentant dissenters enabled the formation
of majorities upholding inconsistent results. With two votes against
the imposition of the death penalty under any circumstances, the
defendant needed to convince only three of the seven remaining
justices that the challenged sentence ran afoul of Gregg and its
progeny. As a result, state capital punishment statutes were struck
down both because they allowed too little, and because they allowed
too much discretion. 6
L. REv. 837, 837 (1998) (review of CHEERINKSY, CONSTITUTIONAL LAW: PRINCIPLES AND
PoLIClEs (1997)) ("The common law character of constitutional law makes a treatise on the
subject a necessity."); David A. Strauss, Common Law Constitutional Interpretation, 63 U.
CHI. L. REV. 877,877 (1996) (noting "when people interpret the Constitution, they rely not
just on the text but also on the elaborate body of law that has developed, mostly through
judicial decisions, over the years"). Even Akbil Amar, who surely qualifies as a
"documentarian" rather than a "doctrinalist," acknowledges precedent as an exclusionary
reason in constitutional law under certain circumstances. See Akhil Reed Amar, Foreword.
The Document and the Doctrine, 114 HARV. L. REV. 26, 78-89 (2000).
324. See Charles Fried, Impudence, 1992 SUP. CT. REV. 155.
325. See, e.g., Buchanan v. Kentucky, 483 U.S. 402, 407 n.6 (1987):
A "death-qualified" jury is one from which prospective jurors have been
excluded for cause in light of their inability to set aside their views about the
death penalty that would prevent or substantially impair the performance of
[their] duties as [jurors] in accordance with [their] instructions and [their] oath.
The prosecutor may remove such potential jurors ....
(alterations in original) (citations omitted).
326. Compare Sumner v. Shuman, 483 U.S. 66 (1987) (six Justice majority, including
Brennan and Marshall, holding that statute mandating death penalty for murder committed
by prisoner serving life-without-parole is unconstitutional) and Woodson v. North Carolina,
428 U.S. 280 (1976) (five Justice majority, including Brennan and Marshall, holding
mandatory death penalty statute unconstitutional), with Eddings v. Oklahoma, 455 U.S. 104
(1982) (five Justice majority, including Brennan and Marshall, holding that death penalty
jury must be allowed to consider any mitigating factor proffered by the defense) and Lockett
v. Ohio, 438 U.S. 586 (1978) (four Justices concluding that state statute gives insufficient
scope to consideration of mitigating circumstances; Justice Marshall concurring on ground
that death penalty is perse unconstitutional; two other Justices concurring on yet other, but
respective, grounds). The tension in the Eighth Amendment cases is generally agreed on,
regardless of ideological attitudes toward the death penalty. See Calins v. Collins, 510 U.S.
1141,1141-42 (1994) (Scalia, J., concurringin denialofcertiorari) ("[This Court has attached
to the imposition of the death penalty two quite incompatible sets of commands: the
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The death penalty example is telling in another way as well.
Continued dissent has been the exception, not the rule. Many
prominent criminal procedure examples might be cited, including
Justices White's majority opinion in Edwards v. Arizona 27 and
Justice Harlan's concurring opinion in Orozco v. Texas,32 both
applying Miranda. Chief Justice Rehnquist's Dickerson opinion
reflects the same respect for authority, although Miranda predates
the Chief Justice's tenure on the Court. That only a few Justices
have felt the need for repeated dissent in the especially troubling
moral context of capital punishment does more to bolster than to
weaken the argument for scrupulous stare decisis 29
If we add the need for broad rulings in the criminal context to the
powerful case for treating majority decisions as binding individual
justices, we have a compelling warrant against the Marshall/
Brennan/Blackmun practice in the death cases and against the
promised Scalia/Thomas practice in future Miranda cases. The
clarity of the needed rules will be compromised, and like cases will
be treated differently. The general duty of officers of the Republic
to obey the Constitution as construed by the Court is given special
urgency in the criminal context.
My claim is distinct from any claim that criminal procedure
precedents deserve special deference from future Supreme Court
majorities. Quite the reverse; given the volume of constitutional
litigation involving criminal procedure questions, Supreme Court
majorities should feel at least as free to overrule precedent in
these cases as in others. The larger the corpus of precedents the
more likely that inconsistent outliers will emerge over time. For
sentencer's discretion to impose death must be closely confined, but the sentencer's discretion
not to impose death (to extend mercy) must be unlimited.") (emphasis in original) (citations
omitted); id. at 1149 (Blackmun, J., dissenting from the denial of certiorari) ("Experience has
shown that the consistency and rationality promised in Furman are inversely related to the
fairness owed the individualwhen considering a sentence ofdeath. A step toward consistency
is a step away from fairness."); Carol S. Steiker & Jordan M. Steiker, Sober Second
Thoughts: Reflections on Two Decades of Constitutional Regulation of Capital Punishment,
109 HARV. L. REV. 355, 382 (1995) ("This dilemma between Gregg's seeming insistence on
channelingand Woodson's seeminginsistenceonuncircumscribedconsiderationofmitigating
evidence constitutes the central dilemma in post.Furman capital punishment law.").
327. 451 U.S. 477 (1981).
328. 394 U.S. 324 (1969).
329. Justice Brennan himself recognized a judge's "general duty ... to acquiesce in the
rulings of that court" and equated this with an "unquestioned duty to obey and respect the
law." Brennan, supra note 319, at 437.
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that reason the Court should have a clear conscience about peri-
odically cleaning house.
Views about the weight of the content-independent respect
constitutional precedents deserve from succeeding majorities of
the Supreme Court vary. Justice Brandeis famously argued that
because constitutional decisions could not be changed by ordinary
legislation, the Court should feel more willing to reconsider consti-
tutional precedents than decisions that Congress or the states could
modify by statute.3 0 By now equally famous is the plurality view
in Planned Parenthood of Pennsylvania v. Casey,3 1 that especially
prominent decisions inviting extensive reliance should not be
overruled in the face of criticism that might be understood as an
attack on the Court's independence.
The criminal procedure context generally calls for following the
Brandeis approach. The Supreme Court makes a vast amount of
quite quotidian law regulating the police and the criminal trial
process. A few landmarks stand out; Gideon and Miranda most
prominently. But in the main the Court has become, by the default
of legislatures and the textual commands of the Constitution, the
most important source of criminal procedure law. Given this insti-
tutional context, when a Supreme Court precedent loses majority
support, conflicts with other decisions that retain majority support,
and a case presenting the question comes properly before the Court,
there should be a willingness to overrule openly rather than to put
on the fig leaf of unconvincing distinctions.
In particular, after Dickerson, the decision in Hass seems
egregious. InHass, the suspect was warned but invoked his rights.
A grand jury witness who did the same could be questioned further
only under an immunity order. Dickerson holds that Miranda rests
on the Fifth Amendment, the same provision at issue in Portash.
Whatever distinctions may separate Harris (in which the defendant
was not properly warned but never asserted his rights) from
Portash, Hass and Portash seem far too similar to permit their
inconsistent holdings to remain the law.
The members of the Dickerson majority, however, could not
agree on a compromise rationale that reconciles the prophylactic-
rules cases with Miranda and Dickerson. Evidently the individual
330. Burnetv. Coronado Oil & Gas Co., 285 U.S. 393,405 (1932) (Brandeis, J., dissenting).
331. 505 U.S. 833, 867 (1992) (plurality opinion).
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Justices in the majority found living with a legitimacy deficit less
objectionable than any theory that accepts both Miranda and the
prophylactic-rules cases. As individuals, the Justices prefer to wait
for a change in legal circumstances, a change of heart among some
of their colleagues, or a change in the membership of the Court
before reworking the Miranda caselaw generally.
This is the very sort of waiting game Professor Sunstein defends
in other circumstances. But if my assessment of criminal proce-
dure's institutional context is correct, police, suspects, lower courts,
and legislatures must now pay a heavy price for continued
uncertainty. What I have suggested here is that given the insti-
tutional context of criminal procedure, individual justices should
adopt an especially scrupulous approach to stare decisis in this
branch of constitutional law. On the one hand, individual justices
should accept the justifying logic, as well as the precise holdings, of
prior cases. On the other hand, when a result no longer commands
majority support, the need for clarity and consistency counsels an
open willingness to overrule. In a nutshell, the idea is that
scrupulous stare decisis might supply the shallow justification for
wide rules that have otherwise lost majority support for their deep
justifications.
Dickerson and the death penalty cases indicate, however, that
persuading individual justices to accept this approach to precedent
is at best conjectural. That is why I have tried to connect the
general point about Cooper v. Aaron and judicial supremacy to the
unique institutional concerns of the criminal process. There is, I
hasten to add, no higher authority to which one may appeal; I am
not suggesting that unrepentant dissent is impeachable. I am
suggesting that it conflicts with propositions about judicial
supremacy to which most of the Justices continue to adhere, and
that it is injurious to rule-of-law values.
One reason why individual Justices may adhere to views
expressed in dissent is because the deep justifications called for by
wide rulings generate intense controversy. In the next section I
explore a different doctrinal strategy for identifying a shallow
justification for wide criminal procedure rulings. This strategy
involves basing wide criminal procedure rulings on more general
textual foundations. The less particular the governing text, the
greater the likelihood of securing agreement on both the rules, and
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their rationale, from the widest possible spectrum of ideological
positions. The final section explores this possibility.
C. Moving to More General Doctrinal Sources
The contrast between Belton and Miranda is illuminating. Just
like Miranda, Belton announces a broad rule supported by a
controversial rationale."3 2 But Belton has not generated the same
controversy as Miranda. Nor can we explain the placid history of
the Belton rule by the fact that it favors the prosecution. In the
first place, Belton keeps the arresting officer out of the trunk, and
so in some cases operates against the police. Conversely, Miranda
sometimes benefits the police, as when a valid Miranda waiver
counts heavily against a coercion claim. In the second place,
Miranda is a popular decision. However much people generally
want law and order, they are proud to live in a country where the
police must warn arrested persons of their rights to silence and to
counsel.
Nor does the explanation lie in Belton's recency. Belton will turn
twenty within a year, and only two Justices who sat on that case
remain on the Court. It stands to reason that if polled as a matter
of first impression, several members of the current court might
question the validity of reading a padlocked diary found in a locked
glove compartment at a time when the arrested driver was locked,
handcuffed, in the back of a police cruiser. Yet Belton is not
generally regarded as liable to a legitimacy deficit or as qualified by
inconsistent precedents.
At least part of the explanation has to do with the generality of
the Fourth Amendment. In Miranda the Court struck a not
unreasonable compromise that requires a logic-defying reading of
the much more specific text of the Fifth Amendment. If custody
plus interrogation equals coercion, how can the suspect make a
voluntary waiver? If custody does not equal compulsion per se,
however, why is the answer to a single straightforward question
suppressed in the absence of the warnings? The Miranda approach
makes a certain amount of sense, but it is hard to derive such a
compromise from the language of the Fifth Amendment.
332. See supra notes 244-52 and accompanying text.
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By contrast, the term "unreasonable searches and seizures" is
conclusory. It does not forbid a specific practice, like compelling
confessions. It forbids instead what the courts find unreasonable.
Given the volume of criminal cases, it makes sense to express
judgments about reasonableness in categorical, rule-like terms. And
if that is so, it is easy to justify police compliance with a reasonable
rule, even when the precise police conduct might be deemed
unreasonable as a matter of case-by-case adjudication.
Imagine, for a moment, that Miranda were understood in Fourth
Amendment terms. Custodial questioning, the theory might go,
increases the burden of arrest, much as does a strip-search or
prolonged detention without judicial authorization, both of which
violate the Fourth Amendment even though there is probable cause
for the arrest. Given the warnings, however, questioning becomes
reasonable rather than unreasonable. Because modern Fourth
Amendment doctrine concentrates on preventing police misconduct
rather than protecting individual autonomy, cutting back on the
Miranda exclusionary rule would be congruent with the Fourth
Amendment exclusionary rule cases, although Elstad may have
taken too generous a view of derivative evidence even from a Fourth
Amendment perspective.
I am not trying to reinvent Miranda; it is too late for that. But I
am suggesting that, given the pressing need for rules in the
criminal procedure context, the Court should base bright-line rules
on the most, rather than the least, general constitutional provision
that applies. Rules based on the Fourth Amendment, for instance,
will be both over- and under-inclusive; all rules are. But it is easier
to classify over- and under-inclusion as legitimate, and to maintain
a rule over time, when a compromise of some sort is clearly
permitted by the constitutional text.
Consider the application of the Mathews v. Eldridge3 ' test in
administrative due process cases. Typically, in a particular context
-welfare benefits, termination of public employment, public school
discipline, and so on-the Court considers the benefits and burdens
of additional procedural safeguards, and concludes on the basis of
those factors that a particular process is (or is not) constitutionally
adequate for that class of decisions.3 4 Just as in the criminal
333. 424 U.S. 319 (1976).
334. See, e.g., id.; Cleveland Bd. of Educ. v. Loudermill, 470 U.S. 532 (1985) (termination
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context, in the administrative due process cases, the volume of
disputes weighs heavily against case-by-case adjudication. Because
due process requires procedural fairness-a highly general norm-
it is much more plausible for the Court to announce the procedures
required in all future public employment discharge cases, or public
housing termination cases, or what have you. This is no more
judicial legislation than Miranda, but since any judicial decision
about how much process is enough will be arbitrary at the margins,
there seems to be no legitimacy deficit attending the announcement
of a general rule for future cases.
There is one other important feature about the Mathews v.
Eldridge case law. There is widespread dispute about the precise
mission of administrative procedure,"3 5 but on all accounts
instrumental reliability is one important value the administrative
process should promote. Once a decision based on instrumental
reliability prescribes rules of procedure for future administrative
cases, those rules are not likely to change with shifts in the
membership of the Court. Reliability will be a very important
desideratum no matter who the new justices turn out to be, and the
cost of repeatedly fine-tuning the Mathews calculation will be
obvious to them.
At the time Miranda was decided, the governing assumption was
that due process adjudication meant case-by-case adjudication.
That assumption is no longer valid. In both administrative cases
and criminal cases, the Court commonly announces a generally-
applicable rule founded on due process. Just as with the Terry
standard under the Fourth Amendment, in some contexts standards
are preferable to rules even given high case volumes. But it is
entirely possible to derive rules of Miranda's formal type from the
of public employment); Goldberg v. Kelly, 397 U.S. 254 (1970) (welfare benefits); ALFRED C.
AMAN, JR. & WJILAXIT. MAYTON, ADMINISTRATIVE LAW § 7.6.5, at 181 (1993) ("[T'he Court
emphasized that in applying this three-part test the courts should not address the
circumstances ofthe individual claiming due process, but the courts should instead consider
the 'generality' of cases."); STEPHEN G. BREYER ET AL., ADMINISTRATIVE LAW AND
REGUIATORYPOLICY705-06(4thed. 1999) (notingMathews test usually applied onwholesale
rather than retail basis, although exceptional cases require case-specific rulings on required
procedures).
335. It has been argued, for example, that the focus on instrumental values in Mathews
v. Eldridge fails to show appropriate respect for the dignity of individuals. See, e.g., Jerry
Mashaw, The Supreme Court's Calculus for Administrative Adjudication in Mathews v.
Eldridge: Three Factors in Search of a Theory of Value, 44 U. CHI. L. REv. 28 (1976).
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Fourth Amendment's reasonableness clause, 36 or the due process
clause.33 The higher level of generality characteristic of these latter
provisions would reduce the legitimacy deficit attending the
promulgation of doctrine in terms of rules. It would also increase
the chances that justices with various abstract political or juris-
prudential theories could subscribe to the underlyingjustifications
of rules previously announced. The current Court looks with skep-
ticism on criminal procedure claims based on due process rather
than on the Bill of Rights. 38 If the argument here advanced is
persuasive, that skepticism should be reconsidered, at least when
what is at issue is the doctrinal basis of a rule to govern many
similar future cases.
CONCLUSION
Just as with Sunstein's case for judicial minimalism, this
argument in favor of wide but shallow rulings in criminal procedure
is a matter of degree. Some contexts call for case-by-case ad-
judication even in the criminal context (prejudicial pretrial publicity
claims, for example). Many others, however, prominently including
custodial interrogation, are better served by a second-best rule
consistently applied over time than by case-by-case adjudication
aimed at doing precise justice in each case.
Wide rulings run into trouble on the dimension of depth.
Dickerson, for instance, reaffirms Miranda, but the seven-Justice
336. See, e.g., County of Riverside v. McLaughlin, 500 U.S. 44 (1991) (presumption that
judicial determination of probable cause within 48 hours is reasonable, and that
determination after 48 hours is unreasonable); United States v. Ross, 456 U.S. 798 (1982)
(search of automobile supported by probable cause may, without authorization of warrant,
extend to any container within vehicle that might contain the suspected evidence); New York
v. Belton, 453 U.S. 454 (1981) (search incident to arrest of motorist may extend, without
warrant or probable cause, to passenger compartment of vehicle and containers thereof).
337. See, e.g., United States v. Bagley, 473 U.S. 667 (1985) (upon timely specific request
government must disclose exculpatory evidence in every case); In re Winship, 397 U.S. 358
(1970) (government must prove elements of crime beyond reasonable doubt in every criminal
case).
338. See Sacramento v. Lewis, 523 U.S. 833 (1998) (free-standing due process claims in
criminal procedure context disfavored; substantive due process violated onlyby practices that
shock the conscience); Medina v. California, 505 U.S. 437 (1992) (refusing to apply Mathews
test in criminal procedure context; criminal procedure will satisfy procedural due process
unless it is an unreliable departure from tradition or is fundamentally unfair in operation).
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majority clearly does not agree on a single justifying theory. So we
will wait for the other shoe to drop, which in this case means
seeing how the lower courts treat the fruits and impeachment
exceptions now that Miranda is clearly established as a consti-
tutional doctrine. Because there are so many confessions cases, the
lower courts will not have the luxury of deferring that process. They
can mechanically follow the inconsistent Supreme Court cases, or
they can attempt a common-law type synthesis. Rule of law values
counsel the latter approach, but the Supreme Court's opinion
presents courts that attempt such a synthesis a daunting challenge.
What the lower courts clearly cannot do is reorient criminal
procedure doctrine away from divisive ideals about autonomy and
dignity, toward more modest but more widely accepted values such
as instrumental reliability, which is to say, away from Bill of Rights
particulars and toward due process generalizations. In the absence
of some such reorientation, the need for rules will clash with
important considerations of legitimacy, stability, and consistency.
Given that any turn toward more general doctrinal foundations can
come from only one source, Dickerson suggests that we will be
living, rather than dealing, with this tension for the foreseeable
future.
